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Abstract

This thesis seeks to understand the economic/demographic impact of the
American Civil War on Knoxville, Tennessee and the greater East Tennessee region. It is
the contention of this work that the Civil War served as an economic/demographic
catalyst, accelerating (although certainly not completing) the process by which both city
and region were transformed from a rural, pre-modem economy based predominantly on
subsistence agriculture to a more modem, industrializing economy based on
manufacturing, resource extraction, and limited commercial farming.
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1
Introduction

On an oppressively hot day in August 183 8,Henry Ruffner, a Presbyterian
minister from Lexington, Virginia, guided his horse up a dusty dirt road and into the
center of downtown Knoxville, Tennessee. Ruffner was,by his own admission, excited
to be visiting the "chief town of East Tennessee," and hoped that it would compare
favorably with the bustling industrial/commercial centers of the Midwest and Northeast.
But his hopes were quickly dashed. So far as he could tell, for his visit was cut short by
an "unusually severe " malaria epidemic, Knoxville was little more than an isolated
hamlet, consisting of a small college, a handful of industries (mostly grain mills), and
"something more than three hundred houses scattered over the hilly ground." What few
residents that he encountered were, in his estimation, "moral, sociable and hospitable,
with all the essentials of true politeness "; but then, they were also lacking in the
"refinement of mind and manners ...found in some older towns." And so,convinced
that Knoxville had little to offer the visitor,either now or in the immediate future, a
disappointed Ruffner got back on his horse, turned northeast towards Virginia,and
disappeared into the countryside. Considering his lack of enthusiasm for the town,one
might easily conclude that he had no intention of ever returning. 1
Ruffner's commentary expresses the thoughts of one man, but it is probably
representative. Antebellum Knoxville would have impressed few nineteenth-century

1

Eugene L. Schwaab and Jaqueline Bull, Travels in the Old South: Selected From Periodicals of
the Times (Lexington, 1973), 358-59; Samuel Joseph Platt and Mary Louise Ogden, Medical Men and
Institutions of Knox County, Tennessee (Knoxville, 1969), 78; Digby Gordon Seymour, Divided
Loyalties: Fort Sanders and the Civil War in East Tennessee (Knoxville, 1963), 10.
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visitors, particularly those who, like Ruffner, had traveled extensively.2 The first thing
one would have noticed on entering the town was its shabbiness. Residents tossed food
scraps and human waste into the narrow, muddy streets, creating a noxious stew
attractive to swine, rats, dogs, and clouds of emerald-green blowflies. The second thing
one would have noticed, aside from the overpowering stench, was the town's near
complete lack of commercial and industrial development. Other than a few small grain
mills, f<;mndries, and wholesale firms, there was little indication that Knoxville was tied
to the larger regional or national economies. Boosters' dream of bringing steamboats to
the city had been only partially fulfilled at the time of Ruffner's visit, thanks to
treacherous shoals on the Holston/Tennessee River system that prohibited year-round
shipping; and their enthusiasm for railroad building, which led them to forego
participation in the state's 1 836 and 1 838 turnpike subsidization programs, had
accomplished nothing, other than to deny the city macadamized roads. If Ruffner's
commentary seems harsh to the modem reader, it is only because he was being honest.
Knoxville was going nowhere fast in 1 838, a fact that was as obvious to frustrated
boosters as it was to their disappointed guests. 3
Let us now consider the opinions of a second visitor, Methodist Episcopal
minister J. M. McTeer, who traveled to Knoxville in December 1 869. Having been to the
city only once before, in 1 837, McTeer expected to find the sleepy, ramshackle town of
2

Prior to his arrival in Knoxville, Ruffner visited Cincinnati, Ohio, Louisville, Kentucky, and
Nashville. See Schwaab and Bull, Travels, 341-52.
3

Platt and Ogden, Medical Men, 78-82; Michael J. McDonald and William Bruce Wheeler,
Knoxville. Tennessee: Continuity and Change in An Appalachian City (Knoxville,1983), 19-20; Mary U.
Rothrock, ed., The French Broad-Holston Country: A History of Knox County. Tennessee (Knoxville,
1946), 84-112.
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Ruffner's experience. Instead he found a commercial/industrial boomtown, smaller in
scale perhaps, but no less dedicated to economic growth and the promotion of
technological innovation than Chicago, Philadelphia, or Pittsburgh. "I knew Knoxville
was favored with railroads and steamboat navigation, " he wrote to the Knoxville Weekly
Whig, "but I did not know that the city had assumed such vast proportions. The broad,
well-improved streets--the large number of new and elegant residences--the music of the
trowel and the hammer--the clatter of new and improved machinery of various kinds--the
hurry in commercial circles--all these and other things interest the stranger who visits
your city. "4
Truly there was much to be seen. A quick walk to north Knoxville would have
revealed a bustling rail depot, crowded with trains transporting coal, iron, zinc,and
timber into the city from outlying East Tennessee counties. 5 Although much of the coal
continued south and east to Georgia and the Carolinas,a significant amount was retained
locally for use by industrialists and homeowners. The city's largest coal consumer,
Hiram S. Chamberlain's Knoxville Iron Works, was also the catalyst for a recent housing
boom. 6 Carpenters had erected some four hundred houses between 1866 and 1868,most
of which were situated in close proximity to the factory (and most of which were
inhabited by Chamberlain's employees). Equally impressive was the city's commercial

4

Knoxville Weekly Whig, 1 December 1869.

5 By 1868, four railroads had termini in Knoxville: the East Tennessee & Georgia and East
Tennessee & Virginia lines, completed in 1855 and 1858 respectively, and the unfinished Knoxville &
Charleston and Knoxville & Kentucky lines. See Knoxville Press and Messenger, 5 November 1868.
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On Chamberlain and his iron works, see Silas Emmett Lucas, Jr., History of Tennessee From the
Earliest Time to the Present (Nashville, 1887), 857.

4
district, for here truly was the crossroads of East Tennessee. Farmers, many of them
residents of the region's rugged geographic margins, guided clattering wagonloads of
grain and vegetables down Gay Street, headed for Market Square. There they sold the
produce to Knoxvillians or to purchasing agents from neighboring states. Before leaving,
many of these farmers visited the city's wholesale houses, searching for good deals on
groceries, furniture, clothing, and agricultural implements. "They all speak well of our
wholesale houses," wrote the Knoxville Press and Messenger proudly, "and admit that it
is no longer worth the expense of a trip to the Eastern cities, when they can get what they
want just as cheap at Knoxville."7
Ruffner's and McTeer's observations are fascinating, not only because they
provide photograph-like "before" and "after" views of Knoxville's history, but because
they differ so much in their descriptions. Ruffner's Knoxville was a ramshackle, isolated
town, seemingly devoid of positive prospects for the future; McTeer's Knoxville was a
thriving city, replete with the commercial outlets and transportation infrastructure
necessary for long-term growth. And yet, for all of their usefulness, these "word
pictures" raise more questions than they answer. For example: How does one account
for nineteenth-century Kn<?xville's profound transformation? What factors, be they
internal, external, or both, contributed to this transformation? Did any one factor stand
out as the preeminent agent of change? And finally, were the results of this
transformation localized, affecting only Knoxville, or did they radiate outward into the
city's hinterland, translating into a broader regional transformation? The goal of this

7
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study,simply stated,is to answer these four questions. Doing so promises to enrich our
knowledge of Knoxville's past,as well as shed light on the city's role as a guiding force
in the economic/demographic life of greater East Tennessee.
Before we proceed,however,let us return once more to Knoxville,this time in
1870. Let us,in particular,walk west down Cumberland Avenue to the base of "College
Hill," and from there climb north to the top of a nearby ridge. In Ruffner's day,this ridge
was little more than a grassy pasture,covered here and there by scrubby second-growth
cedar trees. If Knoxvillians came here at all,it was to gather stray livestock,cut
firewood,or simply to have a look around. And yet,like everything else in Knoxville,
the ridge had since been transformed. Strolling along the summit, even the most casual
observer would have noticed the remains of a massive earthwork fort. Known locally as
Fort Sanders,the fort had,on November 29, 1863, been the scene of a short but intense
battle that pitted Knoxville's beleaguered Union garrison against a Confederate besieging
force. The Yankees won the battle,much to the delight of the region's Unionist majority,
but their victory ultimately proved costly to the citizens. Unable to withdraw south to
Georgia,the defeated Confederates instead marched northeast around Knoxville,settling
into winter quarters near Russellville. For the next five months, the two armies dueled
for control of upper East Tennessee,consuming what remained of the region's food
supplies and provoking a famine. As refugees streamed into Knoxville or over the
Cumberland Mountains into Kentucky and Middle Tennessee, many doubtless considered
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the irony of their plight. Salvation had given way to devastation,and there was little
anyone could do. 8
For the moment,however,Fort Sanders stood silent,seemingly forgotten by the
local population. Save for the occasional band of small children digging through the
ruins in search of bullets,buttons,and other souvenirs,few Knoxvillians appear to have
paid it much heed. Promotional literature published in the 1890s reveals that residents'
disregard for the fort was actually quite intentional; a sort of willful collective memory
loss (at least among boosters),aimed at distancing their city from the racial strife,
violence,and poverty associated with the defeated postwar South. Its very title,for
example,reveals that Knoxville, Tennessee: A City Unsectional and Cosmopolitan by
the Varied Industries of Her People; Climate; Scenery; and Modem Progress sought to
sooth fears of lingering sectionalism among potential investors. The pamphlet's authors
assured readers that "to-day,the events of the war have been so entirely buried with the
things of the dead past,that they are never mentioned or thought of,except in a
remniscental way." Likewise,the 1892 pamphlet Knoxville, Tennessee described the
city's population as "existing in the present and unmindful, if not oblivious,to the dead
and buried past. " Knoxvillians,it seems,viewed (and hoped that investors would view)
the Civil War as one might view a natural disaster: a tragedy,to be sure, but little more
than a temporary halt in the march of human progress. 9

8

On the East Tennessee campaign of 1863-64, see Seymour, Divided Loyalties, and William
Marvel, Burnside (Chapel Hill, 1991), 264-343.
9

John Watkins to Sarah, 16 September 1895, Watkins Letters, Special Collections, University of
Tennessee, Knoxville; Knoxville Tennessee. a City Unsectional and Cosmopolitan by the Varied
Industries of Her People; Climate: Scenery: and Modem Progress (Park Place, New York, 1889), 3;
Knoxville, Tennessee (St. Louis, 1892), 4.
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More often than not, historians have followed boosters' lead when constructing
narratives of nineteenth-century Knoxville's transformation. That is, their tendency has
been to treat the war as an interesting aberration in the city's historical landscape, rather
than as a potential agent of economic/demographic change.
In Mary U. Rothrock's anthology The French Broad-Holston Country: A History
of Knox County, Tennessee, for example, little effort is made to integrate the Civil War
into discussions of pre- and post-war economic/demographic development. Two essays
on "Knox County in Wartime" are sandwiched between such pieces as "Farming From
the Beginning to 1860" and "Commercial and Industrial Trends since 1865," an
arrangement that leaves readers with the impression that "peacetime Knoxville" and
"wartime Knoxville" were separate, irreconcilable entities. Sadly, the content of these
essays does little to diminish this sense of historical dissonance. In "The Transition
Period, 1864-1876," Polly Creekmore insists that "the [Civil] war had a pronounced
effect on the municipal development of Knoxville," without then explaining how or why.
The reader is left to wonder whether (if at all) demographic changes arising from the war,
such as emancipation or the flight of white refugees, contributed to the city's rapid
postwar growth. Furthermore, in "Farming from 1860 to 1900," C. E. Allred points out
that the Civil War devastated the agricultural economy of East Tennessee, resulting in
some "out-migration [of bankrupt farmers] to the western states." He does not, however,
address the degree to which this rural exodus proved helpful (if at all) to Knoxville's
emergent industrial economy. 10

10

Mary U. Rothrock, ed., The French Broad-Holston Country (Knoxville, 1946), especially xi-xii,
143-44, 146, 186.
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A second,similar work is Lucile Deadrick's Heart of the Valley: A History of
Knoxville, Tennessee. Although heavier on analytical content than Rothrock--William J.
McArthur's "Knoxville's History: An Interpretation," is particularly useful--the essays in
this work likewise marginalize the Civil War as an agent of economic/demographic
change. In "Transportation Development," Edwin P. Patton says virtually nothing of the
Civil War or its impact on East Tennessee's road and rail systems. Likewise,in
discussing the contrast between Knoxville's pre- and post-war industrial development,
Aelread J. Gray and Susan F. Adams state simply that "the boom which had started in the
1850s continued [into the post-war years]. " Even McArthur's essay leaves the reader
wanting more,for he offers only the vague assertion that "the Civil War is too important
an event not to be considered as something of a watershed in the history of the city. .. . In
the thirty years or so after the war modem Knoxville . . . came into being. " True, he does
acknowledge the link between the Civil War and emancipation, and hence the postwar
surge in Knoxville's black population. But he says nothing of black East Tennesseans'
contribution to the city's emergent industrial economy,other than to note that they
"participated significantly in the political,business,and cultural life. " 1 1
More useful, and yet no less prone to marginalize the Civil War,is Michael J.
McDonald's and William Bruce Wheeler's Knoxville, Tennessee: Continuity and
Change in an Appalachian City. According to McDonald and Wheeler, Knoxville's
meteoric postwar growth may be attributed to a number of factors: a high birthrate
among rural white East Tennesseans that strained the region's limited supply of arable
ll

Lucile Deadrick, ed., Heart of the Valley: A History of Knoxville, Tennessee (Knoxville,
1976), especially 28, 83, 178-236.
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land (and thereby contributed to a postwar rural-to-urban migration of landless,jobless
whites); the emancipation of East Tennessee slaves (who,along with freed slaves from
the Deep South, migrated to Knoxville in search of industrial work); the city's railroads
(built in 185 5 and 1858), which linked it to the "dynamic regions to the north and west ";
the city's access to industrially-valuable natural resources (particularly Anderson County
coal and Roane County iron); a post-war political climate friendly to northern investors;
the arrival of said investors,beginning in the late 1860s; and of course,a long-standing
enthusiasm for industrial development among the city's economic/political elite. "In
some ways," McDonald and Wheeler assert,"Knoxville was in a perfect position to take
advantage of the New South movement. .. . Indeed, to K.noxvillians and interested
outsiders, it seemed that the once-sleepy town possessed all the ingredients necessary to
become a major city. " 12
McDonald and Wheeler are,by their own admission,applying a classic model of
urban development to Knoxville. "Urban absorption of hinterland labor," they insist, "is
one of the characteristics inherent in the transformation of premodern to modern societies
in Western Europe and Britain and the nineteenth century. It is applicable to Knoxville
because industrial Knoxville absorbed ... Appalachian [white] and southern black labor,
both of which groups came from what could be termed 'premodern' environments,or at
least 'transitional' ones between premodern and modern." 1 3

12

Michael J. McDonald and William Bruce Wheeler, Knoxville, Tennessee: Continuity and
Change in a Southern Aimalachian City (1983), 3-3 1.
13

Ibid., 4.
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Rodney White and Joseph Whitney explain this model more thoroughly in their
essay "Cities and Environment: An Overview, " arguing that cities tend to pass through
two 4istinct stages on their way to maturity. The first or "Pre-Modern Quasi-sustainable
Settlements " stage is characterized by a community of small cities surrounded by a large,
self-sufficient rural population. Because cities in this stage are dependent on natural
transportation (particularly rivers) for the importation of foodstuffs and other bulky
commodities, they are unable to support large urban populations or heavy industry. Thus,
no one city in the community is able to establish itself as a "nodal point " of
economic/demographic power, although certain natural advantages such as deep water
ports and level farmland (or the lack thereof), may lead to size discrepancies among
community members. During the second or "Colonial/Industrial Revolution " stage,
railroads, canals, and other transportation technologies reduce the "traditional effects of
distance, " increasing the profitability of commercial farming and initiating a rural land
scramble. Subsistence farmers and tenant laborers are pushed aside by their wealthier
neighbors, creating a pool of cheap labor beneficial to emergent urban industries. For a
variety of reasons, one city may emerge from this transitional period as a dominant
economic/demographic power. Neighboring communities may stagnate or even decrease
in size, further empowering the regional hegemon. 1 4

14

Rodney White and Joseph Whitney, "Cities and Environment: An Overview," in Richard Stren,
Rodney White, and Joseph Whitney, eds., Sustainable Cities: Urbanization and the Environment in
International Perspective (Boulder, 1991), 8-51. Environmental historians have used similar models when
constructing narratives of Chicago and New Orleans. See William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis: Chicago
and the Great West (New York, 1991) and Ari Kelman, A River and Its City: The Nature of Landscape in
New Orleans (Berkeley, 2003).
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Historiography provides support for Wheeler's and McDonald's argument,
verifying that antebellum East Tennessee was ripe for an economic/demographic
transition. In his History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860,Lewis
Cecil Gray reveals that ruinous agricultural practices,particularly an overdependence on
com cultivation and livestock droving,exacted a terrible toll on East Tennessee farmland
prior to the Civil War. Entire valleys had,by 1860,been stripped of their fertility,
leaving subsistence farmers with little choice but to clear and cultivate marginal lands. 1 5
Ruinous agricultural practices were,however,only part of the problem. Antebellum East
Tennessee,writes Robert Tracy McKenzie in his essay '"Oh! Ours is a Deplorable
Condition': The Economic Impact of the Civil War in Upper East Tennessee," suffered
from a higher degree of landlessness than did the Deep South,giving lie to the notion that
the region was the domain of a self-sufficient yeomanry. The chief culprit was a
burgeoning rural population that exceeded the region's ever-diminishing supply of arable
land. Noel C. Fisher in War At Every Door: Partisan Politics and Guerilla Violence in
East Tennessee, 1860- 1869 and W. Todd Groce in Mountain Rebels: East Tennessee
Confederates the Civil War, 1860- 1870 insist,ironically enough, that the arrival of
railroads in 1855 and 1858 propelled the region even further toward the demographic
precipice. Increased market connections fueled a wheat boom in East Tennessee,and
15

Lewis Cecil Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860, 2 vols.
(Washington, D. C., 1933), 840. For more on nineteenth-century East Tennessee agricultural practices, see
H. J. Benser and C. C. Mantle, Agricultural History of Knox County, Tennessee, Volume II (Knoxville,
1945), especially 1 , 12; Robert Tracy McKenzie, One South Or Many: Plantation Belt and Upcountry in
Civil War Era Tennessee (Cambridge, 1994), especially 37; Donald Edward Davis, Where There Are
Mountains: An Environmental History of the Southern Appalachians (Athens, Georgia, 2000), especially
108; and Margaret Lynn Brown, The Wild East: A Biography of the Great Smoky Mountains
(Gainesville, Florida, 2000), especially 30-42. For a general study of nineteenth-century Southern
agricultural practices, see Albert E. Cowdrey, This Land, This South: An Environmental History
(Lexington, 1996).
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hence a rural land-scramble among wealthy landholders. Small landholders and tenant
laborers were pushed aside, leaving them in precarious economic circumstances. 1 6
It should therefore come as no surprise that post-bellum Knoxville developed into
what White and Whitney term a "nodal point" of economic/demographic power in East
Tennessee. After all, the city possessed the transportation technologies needed to
overcome the "friction of distance" when importing foodstuffs and natural resources
(enabling it to support both a large urban population and heavy industry), was surrounded
by a demographically unstable rural population in need of work, and was attractive to
Northerners as a locus of investment. It doubtless helped that Knoxvillians had long
dreamed of establishing their city as an economic/demographic capital, and were thus
willing to embrace change. As early as 1847, the Knoxville Register had insisted that "it
is . . . the interest of our division of the State to build up in our midst a commercial
emporium, where a ready market may be found for the products of the surrounding
country. . . . By position . . . by weight of capital, Knoxville is eminently the site for that
emporium." Twelve years later, C. S. Williams's Williams' Knoxville Directory, City
Guide, and Business Mirror echoed the Register's sentiments: "Manufactories of
different kinds are prospering and more must and will spring up. . . . Our town is destined
to become a large manufacturing place." 1 7

16

Robert Tracy McKenzie, "'Oh! Ours is a Deplorable Condition': The Economic Impact of the
Civil War in Upper East Tennessee," in The Civil War in Appalachia, Kenneth W. Noe and Shannon H.
Wilson, eds., (Knoxville, 1997), 199-226; Noel C. Fisher, War At Every Door: Partisan Politics and
Guerilla Violence in East Tennessee, 1860-1869 (Chapel Hill, 1997), 19-20; W. Todd Groce, Mountain
Rebels: East Tennessee Confederates and the Civil War, 1860-1870 (Knoxville, 1999), 4-13, 18-20.
17

C. S. Williams, Williams' Knoxville Directory, City Guide, and Business Mirror (Knoxville,
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But then, where does this leave the Civil War? Should we dismiss the conflict as a
mere interruption between two otherwise peaceful periods of development, or should we
examine it as a potential agent of economic/demographic change in nineteenth-century
Knoxville (and East Tennessee)? Before we answer this question, let us get a feel for the
historiographical trends. 1 8 Among the myriad causative factors that McDonald and
Wheeler identify as agents of economic/demographic change in nineteenth-century
Knoxville and East Tennessee, emancipation alone may be attributed directly to the Civil
War. The rest were already influencing the pace and direction of development before the
war (such as railroads and rural demographic stress), or began doing so soon after the
conclusion of hostilities (Northern investment and rural-to-urban migration). Based on
their decision to forego a lengthy discussion of pre-war and wartime history, one may
infer that McDonald and Wheeler view the Civil War as having had a minimal impact on
Knoxville and East Tennessee, at least as it regarded long-term economic/demographic
development. If anything, the war served in their opinion to retard the city's and the
region's transformation by consuming resources, stealing away labor in the form of
military enlistments, and temporarily disrupting commerce. 1 9
McKenzie offers an analysis of the war's profound economic impact in East
Tennessee, noting that it amounted to a loss of nearly three-fifths of the region's pre-war
wealth. He also mentions the privation and demographic upheaval experienced by
civilians during and after the winter of 1 863-64, which McDonald and Wheeler fail to do.
18

I will, at this time, forego further discussion of Rothrock and Deadrick, as their failure to make
useful connections between pre-war, wartime, and postwar Knoxville have already been noted.
19

McDonald and Wheeler, Knoxville, Tennessee, 4.

14
Still, even he largely dismisses (or at least marginalizes) the war as an agent of long-term
economic/demographic change in nineteenth-century East Tennessee. "Despite the
extensive military destruction visited upon the region during the Civil War, " he insists,
no one factor served to influence postwar economic/demographic development more than
the "inexorable pressure of population growth against the region's increasingly rigid land
constraint." And so, while he says nothing of Knoxville's post-war transformation or of
the rural-to-urban migration that made it possible, McKenzie is more or less in agreement
with McDonald and Wheeler. The Civil War,they suggest, was of profound significance
to Knoxville and East Tennessee in the short-term,but had little impact on the city's or
the region's long-term economic/demographic development. 20
I contend that the Civil War has been underestimated as an agent of
economic/demographic change in nineteenth-century Knoxville and East Tennessee. In
fact, I believe that the war served as an economic/demographic catalyst, accelerating
(although certainly not completing) the process by which both city and region were
transformed from a pre-modem economy based primarily on subsistence agriculture to a
more modem industrializing economy based on manufacturing, natural resource
extraction, and limited commercial farming.
Consider for a moment the scope of economic/demographic upheaval caused by
the Civil War in East Tennessee. Tens of thousands of civilians (likely in excess of one
hundred thousand) were displaced, either by force (political persecution and hunger) or
20
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by choice (military enlistment); entire towns were partially or fully destroyed, including
large portions of Knoxville; and the region's agricultural economy was all but obliterated
by Union and Confederate soldiers. Losses in railroad and industrial property were
equally catastrophic: hundreds of cars and locomotives were damaged or destroyed by
soldiers and guerillas, as were numerous depots, machine shops, and miles of railroad
track; and iron-making equipment was stolen from the region's foundries for use in
munitions production or, if required by military expediency, simply destroyed.2 1
But then one must also consider the ironically positive consequences of this
upheaval: many of those rendered homeless and/or destitute had faced precarious
economic circumstances prior to the war, making them ideal candidates for urban
industrial jobs (assuming that such jobs became available); the destruction of East
Tennessee cities diminished competition among the region's urban community, thereby
speeding Knoxville's post-war ascension to the position of regional
economic/demographic hegemon; Union soldiers rebuilt and actually improved the
region's railroads, replacing soft, Southern-made rails with more durable rails of
Northern manufacture (a blessing enjoyed by few Southern sub-regions or cities); and the
chance existed that the region's farmers might be persuaded to abandon ruinous
agricultural practices when resuscitating their lands, thereby reversing the decades-old
21
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cycle of soil exhaustion. Furthermore,residents' staggering capital losses (a short term
hindrance,to be sure) would force them to seek lucrative outside investment if they
wished to rebuild (or would at least encourage them to do so). With slavery gone,the
odds that Northerners (particularly those who opposed the "Peculiar Institution " on
conscientious grounds) would respond to their entreaties were greatly improved. 22
Metaphorically speaking,then,one might compare the Civil War in East
Tennessee to a great conflagration; terrible in its fury,and yet life-giving in the sense that
it made way for new growth and development. In four short years, the region's
conservative,agrarian order was more or less toppled,making way for an infusion of
outside capital,ideas,and technologies. That this new order brought with it a host of
social an economic problems, or that it never quite measured up to boosters'
expectations,is beside the point; the new order came,and the Civil War had a significant
hand in speeding its arrival. 23
My intention is not,however,to imply that the war was the preeminent agent of
economic/demographic change in Knoxville and East Tennessee's profound postbellum
transformation. To ignore the myriad factors that contributed to change in both city and
region before and after the war,including topographical features that encouraged or
discouraged trade and transportation (particularly the high mountains that bordered the
region to the north,east,and west),technological innovations that enabled East
Tennesseans to overcome these topographical barriers,attempts by boosters to influence
22
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the economic habits of their rural neighbors, resistance by rural East Tennesseans to
boosters' machinations, intra-urban competition between Knoxville and other East
Tennessee cities, or even pure blind luck would be as mistaken as ignoring the war itself.
My goal is to craft a seamless, cause-and-effect narrative history of the city and the
region, demonstrating that economic/demographic decision-making by antebellum East
Tennesseans affected the course of the war (making it more destructive than it might
otherwise have been), which in turn affected the course of postwar
economic/demographic developments.

18
Chapter One:
"None Live So Far From Market as Those Who Have Nothing to Sell" :
Economic and Demographic Change in Nineteenth-Century East Tennessee

As dawn broke on October 25, 1854,a large crowd began to move through the
streets of Knoxville,Tennessee,headed for the city's newly constructed fairgrounds. The
first annual Eastern Division of the Tennessee State Fair was scheduled to commence that
morning at nine o'clock and visitors,many of whom had traveled long distances to attend
the festivities,wanted to arrive on time. Among the crowd that day were representatives
of nearly every social and occupational class in East Tennessee. Well-heeled "gentleman
farmers " steered carriages down Gay Street, jostling for position amid the wagons of their
highland neighbors. Foundry operators walked side by side with village blacksmiths,
while Knoxville merchants,eager to entice passers by with the latest retail goods,threw
open their showroom doors. The crowd also reflected East Tennessee's geographic
diversity: twenty-three of the region's thirty-one counties sent judges to oversee the
numerous agricultural and mechanical competitions. Farmers from the rugged
Cumberland table land mingled freely with those living in the foothills of the Unaka
Mountains,all the while under the watchful eye of their wealthier Great Valley
neighbors. 24
For many,the trip to Knoxville had been a long and difficult journey. After all,
nature and neglect had combined in East Tennessee to produce a thoroughly inefficient
transportation network. Famous for the soaring mountains that constitute its
northwestern and southeastern borders,East Tennessee is more properly characterized as
24
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a succession of steep, parallel ridges. These ridges run generally northeast to southwest,
and may go unbroken for fifty miles or more. Although passable on foot or horseback,
these ridges presented an all but insurmountable barrier to wagon traffic. Consequently,
most roads followed the intervening valleys in the same northeast to southwest direction,
except where gaps permitted an east-west passage. To make matters worse, county
governments left road maintenance in the hands of private citizens, few of whom took an
active role in their care. In Knox County, for example, residents were assessed an annual
road maintenance tax of seventy-five cents, payable either in currency or labor. Most
simply paid the tax and looked the other way as nature reclaimed the roads. As historian
Mary U. Rothrock points out, Knox County's frightful roads became something of a local
legend, spawning tales of sinkholes so deep "that horses and wagons had fallen into them
and never been seen again. "25
Still, the difficulty of the trip depended on fairgoers' starting point relative to
Knoxville. Those living in Loudon, for example, needed only to take a ferry across the
Holston River and then follow the stage road thirty-five miles north to the fair site.
Better yet, they could have boarded a steamboat at Loudon's bustling wharf, avoiding the
overland trip altogether. In either case, the trip took less than one day, and could have
been completed at minimal expense. 26 Compare this to the difficulties encountered by
25
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fairgoers departing from Tazewell. Lacking a direct water route to Knoxville, Tazewell
residents had to cross the Clinch River and then head southeast toward Bean's Station
through a gap in Clinch Mountain. Twenty years after the fair, J. B. Killebrew described
the abysmal road connecting these two points, noting that "for a greater part of the
distance [the road] passes up hill and down over great limestone masses as large as a
man's head, and almost impassable for wheeled vehicles." Had their wagon survived this
leg of the journey unscathed, our travelers would have likely spent the night in one of
Bean's Station's hotels before turning southwest toward Knoxville. Assuming that they
got an early start the following morning, they would have completed the remaining fifty
eight miles on relatively good roads, perhaps arriving in Knoxville by dusk. 27
Given the difficulty of overland travel, it is a wonder that so many made the trip
to the fair. And yet travel they did, such that by midmorning on October 25 the
fairgrounds were alive with activity. As the day began, thousands gathered to watch the
region's top livestock breeders display their finest horses, cattle, mules, and donkeys.
Describing the scene two days later, the Knoxville Register boasted that "here on this lot
we beheld more fine . . . horses, than at all the . . . grounds we ever visited." Although a
slight mishap occurred when a horse bolted into the crowd, all but one of the spectators
used their "activity and agility" to avoid being trampled. When the excitement died
27
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down,fairgoers turned their attention to the Domestic Manufactures tent,where women
displayed quilts, baked goods,"trinkets, [and] nicknacks. " Young bachelors swarmed
around a certain Miss Shipley of Bean's Station,praising the quality of her work and,
given the chance,complimenting her for her physical beauty. As noon approached
spectators ceased examining the "ponderous pumpkins,multitudes of mammoth ears of
corn,and turnips innumerable," and gathered around the speakers stand. There,
Frederick S.Heiskell,president of the Knox County Agricultural Association,prepared to
address the crowd. 28
Before beginning,Heiskell perhaps took a moment to ponder the significance of
this gathering. Arrayed before him, figuratively speaking, stood all of East Tennessee.
Prior to the advent of regional rail service,such gatherings were rare,if not altogether
unheard of, in East Tennessee, for the rugged topography and poor roads discouraged
East Tennesseans from engaging in long-distance travel except when absolutely
necessary. Even in Knox County,which was relatively well-developed, rural residents
seldom encountered many of their neighbors. According to Killebrew,the county's
numerous ridges fragmented human communities so that "the inhabitants of one valley
would be as completely cut off from intercourse with those of a neighboring valley,only
a few miles away,as if hundreds of miles intervened. " This is not to suggest that East
28
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Tennesseans lived in a state of pure isolation, for as historian W. Todd Groce points out,
farmers, merchants, and drovers carried on a bustling trade with markets in the Deep
South and along the Atlantic seaboard. Still, only a handful of East Tennesseans actually
accompanied produce shipments beyond the region's borders. An intrepid few made
annual flatboat trips to Knoxville, Chattanooga, and points beyond, but most small
farmers sold crops directly to livestock drovers, rather than risk the hazardous overland
journey to urban markets. 29
The fair thus represented a turning point in the region's history. For the first time,
East Tennesseans had gathered en masse, in a central location, for the purpose of
improving the region's agricultural and industrial economies. To be sure, Knoxville had
long served the region as an important economic, social, and political hub, playing host to
visits from drovers, merchants, religious associations, politicians, and travelers. Such
gatherings, however, were of little use to boosters interested in developing a region-wide
economic strategy. Drovers herding livestock into Market Square, or highland farmers
selling chestnuts from the backs of wagons, had little meaningful contact with one
another, much less with boosters. On completing their sales and purchasing supplies,
most of these visitors simply returned to their respective valleys, taking with them no
more than needed to ensure a modest level of comfort and success. What Knoxville
boosters needed was a platform from which to communicate their vision of the region's
economic future to a broad audience. The fair offered just such a platform, for it
provided material incentives, namely the promise of cash premiums, to lure rural
29
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residents into the city. Moreover, hosting the fair enhanced Knoxville's regional
economic prestige, further solidifying the city's symbolic position as a center of
commerce and prosperity. 3 0
Heiskell began his address by chiding the region's farmers for their lack of formal
education. Likening the human mind to a depleted field, he insisted that education held
the key to "vivifying the dormant seeds of genius and virtue, and redeeming . . . the
neglected wastes of human intellect. " Farmers, Heiskell pointed out, were the region's
largest occupational group and were therefore capable of tremendous political influence.
Should farmers unite behind a common cause, such as pressuring the state government to
fund transportation improvements, the entire region, including fledgling manufacturing
interests, stood to benefit. Unfortunately for boosters, few East Tennessee communities
offered public education in 1854, much less specific agricultural training. Existing
schools, such as Kingston's Rittenhouse Academy and East Tennessee University in
Knoxville, offered curriculums of only marginal use to aspiring farmers. Recognizing
this deficiency, Heiskell insisted that the state "make liberal appropriations towards
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building up an institution for the more general diffusion of information for the particular
advantage of the farming interest. "3 1
Still, it seems unlikely that East Tennesseans would have embraced such
programs, even had they existed. The region's farmers were hesitant to adopt any
technique perceived as "book farming," choosing instead to rely on traditional techniques
shaped by generations of practical experience. Agricultural boosters had long
complained of this "stubbornness," often using the region's newspapers to castigate
farmers. In 1 849, the Register delivered this stinging admonition: "No man is excusable
who, closing his eyes against the bright light which science and improved agriculture
shed around him, plods on, careless and unconcerned, in his system of ruinous
cultivation. . . . Farming according to rational principles never did impoverish a farm."
Although puzzled by this disdain for agricultural education, Heiskell admitted to a degree
of bias in his own right, stating, "we think that those who write, cannot instruct others,
unless they are practical farmers." He nonetheless insisted that most agricultural
scientists were themselves practical farmers, and thus worthy of emulation. 32
Having emphasized the importance of agricultural education, Heiskell moved to
the heart of his address. Looking out over the sea of faces before him, he pleaded with
farmers to abandon the ruinous system of com monoculture that predominated in the
region and replace it with a more diversified program of crop rotation and livestock
31
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husbandry. "It is much better to raise stock than corn to sell, " Heiskell insisted, because
"the former will enrich while the latter will impoverish your soil. " Throughout the
nineteenth century, corn and corn leaves served as the primary source of nutrition for
East Tennesseans and their livestock. The crop required relatively little cultivation and
could be grown in rocky soils and on steep hillsides. Soon after settling on a piece of
land, highland farmers would cut down trees to create new fields, remove the downed
timber, and scatter seed corn between the stumps. If plowing was necessary, farmers
used the bull-tongue plow, characterized by a long, narrow moldboard, to create shallow
furrows amid the numerous rock outcroppings. As late as 1874, Killebrew marveled at
the ability of East Tennessee farmers to raise corn under the most difficult of
circumstances, stating that "we have seen fields of corn upon steep slopes, where the
limestone rocks almost sheeted the surface, that would yield from fifty to seventy bushels
per acre. "33
Although much of the annual harvest went to feed livestock, particularly hogs,
cattle, and poultry, East Tennessee farm families consumed enormous quantities of the
grain. In fact, historian Donald Edward Davis estimates that an average family of seven
consumed 162 bushels of corn per year. Fresh corn on the cob added welcome variety to
meals of chicken, pork, and wild game while cornmeal, more so than wheat or rye flour,
served as a family's primary bread-making ingredient. Corn also provided farm families
with important construction materials and a crude form of currency for use in local barter.
According to Davis, "[corn] husks and leaves were woven into hats, dolls, mops, and
chair bottoms. " Farmers "purchased " plows and other implements with surplus grain,
33
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and hired hands could expect to receive several bushels in exchange for their labor. Com
culture was in fact the very heart of the regional agricultural economy, at least prior to the
advent of rail service in the mid- 1 850s. 34
For all of its blessings, however, excessive com cultivation exacted a terrible
price on the region's soils. Although less destructive than cotton or tobacco, com is a
"hungry" plant that leaches nitrogen, phosphoric acid, and potash from the soil. Farmers
may, with careful crop rotation and the cultivation of cover crops, curb soil depletion and
preserve fertility. In East Tennessee, however, land scarcity led many farmers to plant
com in the same fields year after year, thereby destroying the very basis of their
livelihood. After several years of such abuse, even the most fertile soils lost their ability
to sustain food crops. Devoid of ground cover, hillside soils gave way quickly to erosion,
leaving behind a barren landscape of parched soil and deep gullies. As Albert Cowdrey
points out, "nature, lacking special purposes, does not demand wheat where only thistles
will grow." Such was certainly the case in East Tennessee. Hardy plant species soon
invaded depleted fields, creating thick tangles of underbrush that were difficult to
remove. Persimmon trees, sassafras bushes, and briers all diminished the value of
agricultural land. Broom sedge, perhaps more so than any other "pest species," proved
particularly galling to East Tennessee farmers; once established, it was difficult to
remove, requiring that farmers destroy the entire plant or face recurring infestations. To

34

On com and its many uses, see Davis, Where There Are Mountains, 136-41.

27
make matters worse, broom sedge released seeds into neighboring fields, damaging grass
and wheat. 3 5
Solving the problems associated with com monoculture, Heiskell argued, would
necessitate a complete reorientation of regional agricultural patterns. Under this new
system, farmers could continue to grow com, provided they fed it directly to their
livestock, thus returning valuable organic material to the soil in the form of manure.
Better yet, farmers could curb corn production in favor of clover and grasses, thus
creating verdant pastures capable of sustaining purebred livestock. Favoring the latter
course, Heiskell encouraged the crowd to plant "perennial grasses . . . timothy and herds
grass, as well as the grasses of that class, [which] will grow and make good meadows . . .
on highlands. " According to Killebrew, timothy produced fine hay crops,in addition to
providing ground cover vital to the prevention of soil erosion. Herds-grass, though less
reliable than timothy as a source of hay, has the advantage of extreme adaptability. As
Killebrew pointed out,herds-grass "produces a deep, tough sod of roots, that make a firm
surfacer. . . . In fact, it will yield good crops where other crops would fail altogether. "
Because both of these grasses were well-suited to East Tennessee's limestone soils,
farmers could expect a quick return on their investment. As a bonus, the manure
produced by grazing cattle would further enrich the soil, restoring depleted fields.3 6
While promising, Heiskell's plan was in some respects an impractical solution to
the region's agricultural woes. Transportation difficulties encouraged continued com
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monoculture,even as East Tennesseans watched arable farmland disappear before their
eyes. Prior to the advent of rail service,East Tennesseans depended on rivers as the
primary avenues for shipping bulky commodities out of the region. Each fall, farmers
living near navigable watercourses loaded produce aboard shallow-draft flatboats, which
were then floated downstream to markets in Knoxville,Chattanooga,Decatur,Alabama,
and even New Orleans. Although convenient for some,this mode of transportation
suffered from limitations. First,the region's rivers flowed generally northeast to
southwest, funneling flatboat traffic south into northern Georgia and Alabama. Second,
the region's rivers were,with the exception of portions of the Clinch and
Holston/Tennessee Rivers,far too shallow and rock-infested to support steamboat traffic.
Consequently,while farmers and merchants found it relatively easy to transport goods
out of the region,they found it hard to return home. Those with produce to export were
thus forced to weigh the potential benefits of a downstream journey against the time and
cost of returning. Unless one lived close to a navigable stream and produced crops of
sufficient quality and quantity to bring top dollar in regional markets,the trip would not
have been worth the effort. 37
The alternative,shipping produce overland,was likewise too costly and hazardous
for many small farmers. The region's poor roads strained wagons and draft animals,both
of which were prone to break down on the steep,rocky grades. Dependent on animal
power for plowing,harvesting,and transportation, small farmers were loath to subject
horses,mules,and oxen to unnecessary risk. Consequently,those living in the more
37
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isolated counties, particularly in upper East Tennessee, sold their crops directly to passing
livestock drovers, rather than undertake the difficult journey to distant urban centers.
This practice gave rise to a droving business that, while a pragmatic solution to
transportation difficulties exacerbated the negative consequences of com monoculture.
"Before the Civil War, " historian Lewis Cecil Gray points out, "valleys along the line of
travel were suffering from soil exhaustion due to the exclusive production of grain for
sale to drovers. " Each year, drovers herded thousands of cattle, hogs, sheep, and horses
from the foothills of the Cumberland and Unaka mountains to cities and towns in
Kentucky, East Tennessee, the Carolinas, Alabama, and Georgia. Along the way, .
enterprising farmers pooled their resources to establish com feeding stations, some of
which fed over 150,000 animals per season. Although this mobile market provided
isolated farmers with a convenient means to move their crops overland, droving did them
more harm than good, for the animals devoured underbrush and root systems along their
line of travel, thus intensifying erosion.3 8
Thus, internal isolation and the problems emanating from it had profound
economic/demographic consequences for the region, particularly with regard to urban
growth. To borrow from Rodney White and Joseph Whitney's model, East Tennessee
cities existed in a "pre-modem, quasi-sustainable " stage of development, characterized by
the inability of any one urban center to achieve economic primacy. During this stage,
cities depend on natural transportation corridors such as rivers and valleys for the
importation and exportation of goods. Those on navigable rivers possess an advantage
38
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over landlocked rivals, and are thus able to develop larger hinterlands. For sustainable
urban growth to occur, however, these cities must also have access to land capable of
producing agricultural surpluses. After all, urban residents, particularly those engaged
full-time in industrial or commercial pursuits, depend on rural production. Should an
urban population exceed the production capabilities of its hinterland (henceforth referred
to as its carrying capacity), the city must correct its agricultural deficiencies, import
foodstuffs, or suffer demographic loss. 39
To be sure, Knoxville's situation was conducive to long-term
economic/demographic growth. 40 The city's residents enjoyed access to relatively flat
farmland and broad, navigable watercourses, both rare commodities in a region
characterized by rugged terrain and shallow, rock-strewn rivers. Traveling near
Knoxville in 1 839, Henry Ruffner described the landscape: "towards Knoxville, the hills
were less . . . barren, the lands between them more spacious and fertile. A few miles
below Knoxville, I was at length gratified by the sight of the Holstein [sic], the chief
branch of the T�nnessee. . . . The Holstein has a clear and lively current, winding among
hills, and bluffs, and low grounds." As Killebrew pointed out, thick beds of Magnesian
limestone underlay much of this "spacious" country, giving rise to durable soils that,
given proper care, were capable of maintaining their fertility for generations. As an
added benefit, the Holston River and its numerous east-west tributaries created a lattice-
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work of valuable bottomlands throughout Knox County. "The agricultural value of the
river . . . great as it is, " Killebrew insisted, "is exceeded by the value of its many
tributaries. These are swift and clear creeks, talcing their rise in several instances outside
of the county and flowing through long narrow valleys, fed on either side by . . . branches
that swell them into considerable volume. "4 1
Although Ruffner said little about the agricultural activity he witnessed, he would
have passed numerous farms as he traveled north toward Knoxville. The owners of these
farms, whether they were wealthy planters or families with smaller holdings, took
advantage of the valley's fertile soils to produce a variety of crops. Looking to either
side of the road, Ruffner would have noticed enormous stands of com interspersed with
smaller fields of wheat, oats, rye, and tobacco. He might also have observed the
occasional cotton patch, cultivated by local farmers for home clothing manufacture.
Wandering amid these fields, and kept at bay by sturdy split-rail fences, were thousands
of cattle, hogs, sheep, and horses. A small number of farmers maintained hay and clover
lots for purebred livestock, but most simply turned their animals out to graze on the
county's open range. Census data reveal that Knox County farmers produced enormous
quantities of food crops and livestock in 1 850,more than enough, it seems,to meet the
nutritional needs of Knoxville's population. As Robert Tracy McKenzie points out,
much of this surplus produce went to the residents of larger Southern cities, particularly
Savannah, Charleston, Atlanta, and Richmond. 42
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Still, Knoxville boosters were confident that transportation improvements,
particularly railroads, would allow them to command local resources and transform the
city into the region's premier economic power. As early as 1847, the Register boasted
that "it is undoubtedly the interest of our division of the State to build up in our midst a
commercial emporium, where a ready market may be found for the products of the
surrounding country, and where may flow the comforts of commerce to all around. By
position, by prescriptive usage and by weight of capital, Knoxville is eminently the site
for that emporium." Such statements proved true, even if those making them strayed
occasionally into exaggeration. By 1854 Knoxville was a regional livestock market of
some importance. Each year, drovers herded thousands of cattle, pigs, horses, and sheep
into the city,there selling them to local grain farmers or to purchasing agents from the
Deep South. Knoxville residents also enjoyed access to some forty industrially valuable
minerals, as well as vast stands of timber. Given these advantages, it is little wonder that
the Register boasted that "the scope of country through which [the railroad] will pass,
abounds in resources whose development would not only increase the wealth . ..of our
state, but also tend to add to the welfare of our common country."43
Despite such boasts,Knoxville's future as the hub of the region's economy was
by no means secure. Surrounding Knoxville were a number of smaller communities that
vied for control of the region's lucrative agricultural trade. To the northeast, Bean's
Station stood at the confluence of the region's two most important overland roads, from
which point it diverted agricultural traffic away from Knoxville. Each year, drovers from
43
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upper East Tennessee, Kentucky, Virginia, and the Carolinas passed through Bean's
Station, often stopping to rest in one of the town's hotels. Although many of these
drovers continued southeast toward Knoxville, significant numbers turned east or west at
Bean's Station and headed to markets in Kentucky and North Carolina. In 1 893, the
Bean's Station Improvement Company offered this assessment of the town's importance
to drovers: "There were annually more persons at Bean's Station--Knoxville not
excepted--large numbers of whom were entertained, than at any place in this entire . . .
region." Before dismissing this statement as shameless boosterism, one must also
consider the following description, offered by Killebrew in 1 874: "During the whole of
the first half of the present century, [Bean's Station] was the most 'public place' in the
country. We doubt whether Knoxville, during that period, was visited by as many
strangers."44
Loudon, thirty-five miles south of Knoxville, represented an even greater threat.
The town stood amid farmland similar to that surrounding Knoxville, and was thus able
to draw on abundant agricultural surpluses. According to Killebrew, the land
surrounding Loudon was "perhaps not surpassed by any district of equal extent in the
productive capacity of its soil." Moreover, Loudon's location relative to natural and
manmade transportation networks gave the city a decided advantage in the race to capture
regional agricultural trade. As the northernmost terminus of the uncompleted East
Tennessee & Georgia Railroad, Loudon siphoned marketable produce southward away
from Knoxville. Many farmers, eager to take advantage of high extra-regional market
James T. Shields, Jr., and John M. Goldrick, Bean's Station: Past, Present and Future
(Knoxville, 1 893), 1 -5 ; Killebrew, Introduction, 493 .
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prices, hauled their produce to Loudon rather than sell it to Knoxville buyers.
Steamboats arrived daily at the town's bustling wharf, laden with produce transported
down the Holston River from Knox, Blount, and Sevier Counties, from Kingston on the
Clinch River, and from as far north as Clinton in Anderson County. According to
geographer John W. Benhardt, "traffic was so heavy that steamboats had to lay over
several days to discharge cargo."45
Heiskell understood the dynamics of this intra-regional competition all too well.
Nevertheless, his intent was to rally East Tennesseans against a common threat, rather
than to engage in the partisan promotion of Knoxville's economic interests. Though he
lacked the perspective afforded modern scholars, Heiskell demonstrated a sophisticated
understanding of rural-urban interactions, particularly the relationship between
agricultural production and urban growth. Should the ecological degradation arising
from com monoculture continue, he reasoned, the region stood to lose its arable land, and
hence its ability to produce surplus foodstuffs. The result would be a region of stunted
towns and depleted, weed-choked fields, not unlike the over-farmed districts then
springing up in the wake of Deep South cotton planters. "With our natural advantages,"
Heiskell argued, "we may boast at least an equality with the most favored portion of the
hospitable globe. Surrounded, then, with everything we need . . . shall we not be open to
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the severest reproach from our posterity, and from our surrounding neighbors, if we
persist in doing nothing?',46
Heiskell concluded his remarks with an appeal to his audience's strong sense of
place. East Tennesseans, he insisted, should develop "[their] fertile soil, [their]
numberless water-courses; [their] springs of pure and limpid water, " so as to "incline
those who may come after us to remain in the land where their fathers had lived. " If
contemporary historian and prominent Knox County judge Oliver P. Temple is to be
believed, these words likely had a strong impact on fairgoers. Writing long after the
Civil War, he argued that East Tennesseans "love their country --their own locality-
because it is their home and their possession. Each man feels that the country is, in part,
his own. " Personal sentiments aside, however, Heiskell wished to stem the tide of
ecological destruction before it ruined the region's economic potential. "Soon, " he
reminded the crowd, "our State will be over-spread with an iron net-work of railways. . . .
With our railroads so near completion,we are doomed to a woeful disappointment unless
we be up and doing. . . . Let us go to work or we will find the old aphorism verified that
none live so far from market as those who have nothing to sell. "47
Following Heiskell's remarks,fairgoers returned to the business of enjoying
themselves. As the Whig pointed out, there was much yet to do and see, including "the
exhibition of manufactures, agricultural implements, and the produce of the field, the
garden, the orchard; the dairy . . . and the poultry yard. . . . There was much of interest,
46
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even greater than we can describe. " That evening,the women present worked together to
prepare a grand feast. The bachelors in attendance were,once again,delighted by the
opportunity to mingle with so many single women. "The young men seemed to be
enjoying themselves to the brim," stated the Register,"some of them in fact were running
over with delight--we suppose they were intoxicated--with the beauty ensconced behind
the counters."48
Attendance declined somewhat the following day,although the Register assured
readers that a "vast concourse " greeted organizers as they prepared to open the gates.
After watching a plowing competition, fairgoers gathered once more at the speaker's
stand,this time to listen to the address of prominent Knox County judge William G.
Swan. Most,however,were far more interested in the day's main business, namely the
awarding of cash premiums to the winners of the numerous agricultural and mechanical
competitions. As one might predict, valley farmers captured the majority of the prizes,a
fact that led to no small amount of grumbling among those from highland counties. Still,
the lopsided results do not appear to have dampened the mood of fairgoers. At the
conclusion of the days events, the Register noted,'"the living stream' turned towards
town,every visitor wearing the appearance of a man fully satisfied with the whole
affair."49
If fairgoers were satisfied,Knoxville boosters were ecstatic. "Nothing that has
occurred here in our memory," boasted the Register, "is so well calculated to infuse new
48
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life into every branch of industry as such exhibitions as the one which has just closed and
which has been but a foreshadowing of the future." Heiskell's emphasis on agricultural
improvement touched on but one facet of organizers' overall development program.
Boosters also wished to exploit the region's abundant timber and mineral resources, in
the hope of transforming Knoxville into a regional industrial center. The fair thus
presented the city's economic elite with an additional economic opportunity, for it gave
mine owners and factory operators a chance to display their wares to a regional audience.
Less than one month before the fair began, the Register stated optimistically that "our
judgment is much at fault if the news of such valuable deposits in our hills, does not
spread from one end of the Union to the other, bringing on its reflux a tide of capital
eager to share in the rich rewards of these now mountain locked resources. "50
Despite such optimism, however, little appears to have changed in the immediate
aftermath of the fair. Com monoculture continued unabated, except in those areas
enjoying access to the Loudon railhead. Here began a gradual shift in agricultural
patterns as farmers, eager to take advantage of extra-regional markets, abandoned com in
favor of wheat. In much of the region, however, transportation difficulties continued to
inhibit agricultural development. Poor roads limited the importation of Northern-made
agricultural implements, leaving farmers with little choice but to rely on local
manufacturers. As Lewis Gray points out, "the efficiency of the implements of a
neighborhood was largely dependent on the skill of its blacksmith, a quality sadly
frequently lacking." Even in Knox County, where regular steamboat service permitted
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the importation of bulky goods, farmers faced difficulty acquiring the latest agricultural
machinery. Some implements,such as the Page or disc harrow,saw little or no service in
Knox County until after the Civil War,despite having been patented in 1847. True
change,it seems, would have to wait, at least until the arrival of the railroads less than
one year later. 5 1
On July 4, 1855,East Tennesseans gathered once more in Knoxville,this time to
cheer the arrival of the East Tennessee & Georgia Railroad. Although the first train had
steamed into the city on June 22, boosters sought to increase publicity by staging a joint
Independence Day celebration/railroad "Jubilee " on the Fourth of July. Event organizers
sent notices to East Tennessee newspapers,promising those who attended a fun-filled day
of brass bands, parades, speeches, and fireworks. Unfortunately,the celebration failed to
live up to its billing. On the appointed morning, between five and ten thousand people
eagerly crowded into Knoxville,only to discover that boosters had done a poor job of
planning the event. "We had an immense concourse of people here, " lamented the Whig
on July 7, "but we lacked organization--all was confusion. " For reasons that remain
unclear, boosters failed to secure speakers for the event, leaving spectators with little to
do but mill about and examine the trains. To add insult to injury, a heavy downpour
began late that afternoon, forcing the cancellation of the Independence Day fireworks.
"Out and out," commented the Whig. "the thing was rather a humbug. "52
For Knoxville boosters,the failure of the "jubilee " was of little importance. The
railroad had at long last arrived, ending East Tennesseans' comparative geographic
51
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isolation and alleviating the worst of the region's internal transportation difficulties. To
the delight of men like Heiskell, the railroad had an immediate impact on regional
agricultural patterns, instigating a shift away from com monoculture and toward the
production of market crops, particularly wheat. Like com, wheat required little in the
way of soil preparation or manual labor; each fall, farmers simply scattered the grain over
freshly plowed fields, covered the seeds using a harrow, and then ignored the crop until
the plants matured in spring. In some cases, farmers sowed wheat amid the dried stalks
of recently harvested cornfields, which provided valuable ground cover during the wet
winter months. Though harvesting the crop proved somewhat difficult (rugged terrain
inhibited the use of mechanized threshers and reapers on all but the most level farms),
East Tennesseans relied on their own strength, and that of their draft animals, to produce
abundant yields. Farmers owning the most fertile lands routinely produced fifteen
bushels per acre, although the regional average was closer to eight. 53
In addition to being easy to grow, wheat provided East Tennessee farmers with a
valuable export commodity. The region's flour exceeded that produced by Midwestern
and Northeastern farmers in terms of quality and timeliness, and was soon a bread
making staple in households throughout the United States, the Caribbean Islands, and
South America. Quoting political economist Henry C. Carey, Killebrew argued that '"A
barrel of strictly southern flour will make twenty pounds more bread than Illinois flour,
because, being so much dryer, it takes up more water in making up. . . . [Also,] there is a
peculiarity in the flour which enables it to resist damp, and it will remain fresh and sweet
when flour made from northern grown wheat will become sour, lumpy and worthless."
53
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As an added advantage,East Tennessee wheat matur�d faster than that produced in New
York,giving East Tennesseans a decided edge in the race to fill market demand. By
Carey's estimation,'"southern flour,raised in . . .Tennessee . .. brings from three to five
dollars more per barrel than the best New York Genesee flour.' " It is thus little wonder
that East Tennessee farmers,accustomed as they were to frugality and isolation, rushed to
take advantage of this opportunity for personal enrichment. Wheat production soared
throughout the region between 1855 and 1860, leading to an increase in cultivated
acreage and a concomitant rise in land values. Wheat soon wore "the crown in the
Tennessee Valley," a fact that was no doubt gratifying to agricultural boosters. 54
During this period, valley farmers also took the first tentative steps toward
reorganizing the region's livestock industry. Perhaps influenced by Heiskell's advice,
landowners increased the pasturage on their farms while simultaneously importing
purebred livestock from the bluegrass regions of Middle Tennessee and Kentucky. In
Knox, Roane, Sullivan, Greene, and McMinn,all valley counties, hay production
increased 64 percent between 1849 and 1859. Still, farmers produced less pasturage than
boosters would have preferred. According to historian Edward Hagerman, the average
horse,properly cared for, consumes approximately twenty-six pounds of food each day.
In 1859,the five sample counties produced 23,786 tons,or 47,572,000 pounds,of hay. If
each of the 23,020 horses living in these five counties consumed twenty-six pounds of
hay per day (or 598,520 pounds), the hay supply would have been depleted in just
seventy-nine days. Excluded from these figures,of course, are the 264,947 donkeys,
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mules, cattle, sheep, and hogs then present in the five sample counties, all of which
placed additional demands on pasturage. 55
Knoxville received an economic/demographic boost from the railroads as well,
particularly after workers completed the East Tennessee & Virginia line in June 1 858.
This line, which entered the region near Bristol, Virginia, ran generally southwest
through Elizabethton, Greeneville, Morristown, and New Market before connecting with
the East Tennessee & Georgia in Knoxville. For the first time, foodstuffs could be
shipped the length of the Great Valley in less than one day--northward as well as
southward--easing the subsistence burden from the shoulders of Knox County farmers
and expanding the city's carrying capacity. With each passing train, produce and
livestock from heretofore inaccessible communities of upper and lower East Tennessee
arrived in the city's already substantial agricultural market. According to Williams's
1859 Knoxville Directory, urban residents in search of foodstuffs needed only to stroll
among the myriad farm wagons parked around market square: "Our market is good and
we have plenty to eat--fat beef, mutton and fowl, eggs and butter, the year round. " As the
food supply increased, rural migrants flocked to the city. Among them were doctors,
lawyers, teachers, and merchants who sought a central location from which to conduct
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region-wide business. Knoxville's population more than doubled between 1850 and
1860,increasing from 2,076 to 5,300. 56
There is no doubt that many East Tennesseans benefited from the advent of
regional rail service. Increased market connections brought unprecedented wealth to
valley farmers,and the free flow of agricultural and retail goods allowed Knoxville to
expand its commercial hinterland,and hence its carrying capacity. Still this accounts for
only a small minority of the region's inhabitants. What of those East Tennesseans who
possessed little or no land, or who lived too far from a depot to benefit from the railroad?
According to McKenzie and Groce, these East Tennesseans faced precarious economic
circumstances during the late 1850s,a situation ironically made worse by the arrival of
railroads. As large landholders scrambled to increase their cultivated acreage, tenant and
subsistence farmers had little choice but to work less-profitable land on the region's
geographic margins and continue the ruinous cycle of corn monoculture. Thus, on the
eve of the Civil War,the majority of East Tennesseans found it increasingly difficult to
feed their own families,much less produce marketable surpluses.
Although antebellum East Tennesseans touted their region as a utopia of
independent white farmers, recent scholarship suggests that this was simply not the case.
In fact,McKenzie reveals that white East Tennesseans suffered from a much higher rate
of landlessness than did their neighbors in the Deep South, despite the scarcity of large
scale, slave-based agriculture in Appalachia. Based on a sampling of three East
Tennessee counties,McKenzie concludes that by 1860,43 percent of the region's white
56
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farm families owned no land. Compare this to the Georgia Piedmont,Mississippi Delta,
and Alabama Blackbelt,all significant slaveholding areas, where landless rates were,
respectively,at 37,25,and 19 percent. Of the remaining 57 percent of East Tennessee
farm families who owned land,only about three-fourths possessed sufficient improved
land (fifty or more acres) for self-sufficiency. Thus,by 1 860 well over half of all East
Tennessee farm families were dependent on landlords,neighbors,or local produce
markets for at least part of their subsistence. 5 7
If landless whites faced an uncertain future,so too did many of the region's small
landholders. Ironically, the reorganization of rural and urban spaces instigated by
railroads diminished rather than improved their economic prospects. To understand why,
let us return for a moment to White and Whitney's model. According to these two
authors,nineteenth century transportation improvements had a number of important
consequences,most notably reducing the "friction of distance. " In other words,railroads
reduced shipping costs and travel time,allowing for an increased emphasis on market
agriculture and a corresponding increase in land values. Initially, small landholders
benefited from this new arrangement. However,as land values continued to increase,
large planters,particularly those already holding the most productive acreage,gained a
decided advantage in the race to acquire additional lands. Small landholders, unable to
compete with their wealthier neighbors,were left with three choices: maintaining the
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status quo (with little hope of acquiring new lands), migrating west, or purchasing
cheaper marginal lands far from a rail depot. 58
This is precisely what occurred in East Tennessee during the late 1850s. In the
valley, small landholders and white tenant farmers were pushed aside as wealthier
neighbors, eager to take advantage of the wheat boom, scrambled to increase their
cultivated acreage. Rather than leave the region, however, many small farmers purchased
land or sought agricultural employment in the region's fringe (here defined as the
Cumberland table land and the Unaka foothills). The white population of non-valley
counties increased 20 percent between 1850 and 1860, far outstripping the 12 percent
growth in the most fertile agricultural districts. To make matters worse, planters
imported large numbers of slaves during the late 1850s, further diminishing the prospects
of small farmers and landless whites. Region-wide, the slave population increased 18 _
percent between 1850 and 1860, with five counties (Meigs, Monroe, Polk, Sullivan, and
Rhea) experiencing 30 percent growth. Although the slave population remained
relatively small (never exceeding 10 percent of the region's population), it was
nonetheless sufficient to reduce the availability of agricultural jobs for the landless. As
white farm families became increasingly concentrated in the least productive areas, East
Tennessee edged towards a full-blown demographic crisis. 59
As population pressure increased, farmers attempting to eke out a living on the
highland rim found it increasingly difficult to feed their families. According to historian
Noel C. Fisher, there was simply not enough arable land in East Tennessee to meet the
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nutritional needs of the burgeoning population.60 In Scott,Claiborne,Anderson,Cocke,
and Johnson Counties, for example,the population increased from 30,2 17 to 3 5,656
between 1850 and 1860, a growth rate of 18 percent. These five counties contained just
3,162 farms in 1860, meaning that each landowner,on average,�ad to produce foodstuffs
sufficient to feed eleven people. However,only 59 percent of those farms possessed at
least fifty improved acres,the minimum for self-sufficiency. This is not to suggest that a
state of near-famine existed in these five counties. After all, residents possessed some
eighty-four thousand hogs, and were able to supplement their diets with wild game,
berries,and other naturally available foods. But these figures do demonstrate the
precarious balance that existed between human beings and available foodstuffs in much
of antebellum East Tennessee. 6 1
Unfortunately, farmers in these five counties were, in their very attempt to
produce foodstuffs,pushing the geographic margins of East Tennessee ever closer to
wholesale demographic collapse. Lacking rail connections, those wishing to sell
marketable produce had little choice but to continue the pragmatic but ecologically
harmful cycle of com monoculture and livestock droving. To be sure,those farmers
owning land adjacent to navigable waterways participated in the wheat boom,floating
grain downstream to railheads at Knoxville,Kingston, Loudon,and Chattanooga. For
most, however, the only option was shipping wheat overland, which remained an
impractical and even dangerous undertaking well into the 1870s. As we have seen,even
60
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short trips, such as the sixty-mile circuit between Tazewell and Morristown, placed
wagons and draft animals at considerable risk. According to Killebrew, "It would be
worth a load of com, or hay, oats or wheat to haul it over the road between these two
points."62
For much the same reason, farmers living in these five fringe counties did little to
correct existing agricultural deficiencies. Lacking rail connections, these farmers had
neither the ability nor the economic incentive to import purebred livestock and cultivate
soil-preserving pasturage. As Killebrew pointed out, purebred cattle must be fattened on
pasturage if they are to be of any market value. They must then be moved to the nearest
railhead, preferably over well-maintained roads. As we have seen, however, highland
farmers preferred to graze their livestock on "the luxuriant growth of wild grasses and
succulent vines and shrubbery that clothe the mountain sides and tops." Highland
farmers also continued to rely on native livestock which, while smaller and less
profitable, were hardy enough to withstand long trips over the region's poorly-maintained
roads. Thus, while valley farmers produced an abundance of hay in 1860, those of the
five sample mountain counties produced just 6,088 tons. If each of the 8,683 horses in
these five counties consumed twenty-six pounds of hay each day, they would have
exhausted the forage supply in just fifty-four days (of course, this would not have
oc_curred under normal circumstances, for farmers supplemented their horses' diets with
oats, com,and com leaves). Once again, this figure fails to account for the 62,440
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donkeys, mules, cattle, hogs, and sheep which, to some extent, placed additional demands
on the hay crop. 63
On the eve of the Civil War, East Tennessee was a highly unstable region, caught
in the early stages of a great economic/demographic transition. At the risk of resorting to
fanciful metaphors, the region may be compared to a giant centrifuge, centered in
Knoxville, which rotated on an axis of railroads. Between 1855 and 1860, railroads set
this centrifuge in motion, throwing existing economic, social, and cultural institutions
into a state of flux. The degree to which East Tennesseans experienced this instability,
however, depended on their location relative to the new axis of rotation. Like children on
a merry-go-round, those near the axis were shielded, by and large, from the negative
effects of centrifugal force. In fact, merchants, large landholders, and budding
industrialists used their access to improved transportation, arable land, and investment
capital to emerge more prosperous, if somewhat dizzy, from this period of rapid change.
As the centrifugal forces unleashed by the advent of market capitalism increased,
small landholders and tenant farmers were borne indelibly towards the region's
geographic margins. Here, the force of economic/demographic change held them firmly
in place, leaving them to choose between two rather unattractive options: cling to
ruinous agricultural methods in the vain hope of achieving economic independence, or
relinquish their grip and be tossed from the region. Of these two choices, only the latter
offered a truly viable solution. According to agricultural economists H. J.Benser, C.C.
Mantle, and C. E.Allred, the period between 1850 and 1860 saw a massive out-migration
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from East Tennessee as landless whites succumbed to the siren-song of cheap western
land. If 0. P. Temple is to be believed, however, this decision represented something of
a last resort for the region's farm families. Attached as they were to the hills and valleys
of their birth, many East Tennesseans were loath to abandon homes, cultural institutions,
and agricultural methods, even as they watched their economic prospects diminish with
each passing year. By 1860, one thing was abundantly clear: those living on the region's
geographic margins possessed neither the economic where�ithal nor the transportation
infrastructure to return to the relatively stable center. 64
Given sufficient time, this transition would have worked itself out naturally. The
economic/demographic pressure building on the highland rim, while great, was unlikely
to result in a state of permanent, grinding poverty. It is reasonable to assume that the
construction of an east-west railroad, particularly the proposed Knoxville & Kentucky
line, would have stabilized the region by providing a second axis of rotation.
Figuratively speaking, this rail�oad would have created a smaller, less powerful
centrifuge on the highland rim, capable of counteracting the overwhelming forces then
emanating from the valley. This would not have been a painless process; ·those owning
the best lands stood to consolidate their holdings as land values increased, further
diminishing the economic prospects of landless whites. Still, White and Whitney suggest
that urbanization and industrialization (both trends then underway in East Tennessee)
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would have relieved some of this pressure by providing homes, jobs, and increased
access to foodstuffs.65
Unfortunately for East Tennesseans, other events intervened. In June 1 86 1 , less
than six years after residents gathered to celebrate the completion of the East Tennessee
& Georgia Railroad, Confederate troop trains clattered into Knoxville, bringing the
vanguard of a large occupation force. Given its demographic fragility, East Tennessee
could ill afford a sudden population spike, and yet this is precisely what occurred
beginning in 1 861. Drawn by the region's railroads, as well as by the agricultural
abundance of the central valley, Confederate forces took control of the region, creating
new vortices of instability. Before long the centrifuge that was East Tennessee was
spinning wildly out of control, threatening to propel the entire region into demographic
collapse. 66
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Chapter Two
"Secession . . . has been the ruin of this place'':
East Tennessee and the Confederate Occupation

In late January 1861, a small band of secessionist militia camped atop College
Hill, less than one mile west of downtown Knoxville. Few among the city's residents
appear to have noticed these "soldiers." Militia activity was a common sight in
antebellum East Tennessee, and thus unlikely to raise many eyebrows. College Hill was
otherwise deserted, the students of East Tennessee University, most of whom hailed from
the Deep South, having abandoned their studies to return home. Newspaper editors, even
the staunch Unionist William G. Brownlow of the Knoxville Whig. were far more
interested in the upcoming Tennessee secession referendum, to be held on February 9,
than in the actions of a rag-tag militia unit. Besides, with the nation edging ever closer to
war, armed men might well be needed to defend the city against attack. Predominantly
Unionist in their political sentiments, East Tennesseans made it clear that they would
brook no violation of their Constitutional rights by the forces of either the U. S. or
Confederate government. "Parson " Brownlow, the region's most outspoken anti
secessionist, threatened to· "join the South in a war of extermination " should incoming
president Lincoln renege on his promise to protect slaveowners' rights. 67
Who were these men who aroused so little attention from the citizens of
Knoxville? And why did a band of secessionist militia occupy College Hill more than
four months before Tennessee withdrew from the Union? The first question is difficult to
answer. Save for vague references to their being a mixture of local men and men from
elsewhere in the state, their identities have disappeared from the historical record. The
67
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answer to the second question is more clear. According to historian Digby Seymour,
these men represented a preemptive strike by the state's secessionist governor, Isham G.
Harris, against his political enemies in East Tennessee. Soon after the Tennessee General
Assembly approved the February 9 referendum,whereby voters would be allowed to
approve or disapprove the calling of a secession convention,East Tennessee Unionists
sprang into action. 0. P. Temple wrote: "Not being . . . intimidated by the inflammatory
appeal of the governor,the loyal people of East Tennessee at once organized for the
approaching contest. The ablest and strongest men were selected in every county as
candidates for the convention. " Faced with this challenge, Harris dispatched the militia
in an attempt to intimidate voters and disrupt Unionist rallies. In one instance,
Knoxville's would-be Confederates blared "Dixie " from a Gay Street hotel,drowning out
Andrew Johnson as he delivered a speech. Armed men then scattered the audience.
Bloodshed was avoided by only the narrowest of margins. 68
To the delight of Unionists, Harris's scare-tactics did little to sway the electorate;
the referendum failed by a vote of 69,387 to 57,978. The crisis having passed,at least for
the moment,boosters returned to the more mundane business of regional economic
promotion. The Whig expressed confidence that the Knoxville & Kentucky Railroad
would be completed as far north as the rich coal fields of Anderson County by the
coming fall. On March 30,Brownlow editorialized: "Success to this road,for it will
contribute greatly towards building up our city,and furnishing employment to
mechanics. " Brownlow also encouraged East Tennesseans to invest in a proposed
Cincinnati, Cumberland Gap, & Charleston Railroad. If built,the road would provide
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much-needed market connections for the region's geographic fringe, Thus allowing
alternatives to com culture and slowing soil depletion. Moreover, such a road promised
to catalyze urban growth in the region's northeastern counties, particularly near
Morristown, where the road would bisect the East Tennessee & Virginia line. "[The
railroad] will build up quite a town [at Morristown]," the Parson reasoned, "and call for
one or two large Hotels. The Hotels ought to be under way now, so as to be ready when
needed. "69
Try as they might, however, East Tennesseans were unable to remain aloof from
escalating sectional tensions. Deep South secessionists, angered by Tennesseans' pro
Union stance, threatened to restrict inter-state trade. In March, the Georgia legislature
placed a 25 percent export tax on groceries purchased by Tennessee buyers. Incredibly,
many Deep Southerners began importing grain and livestock from the Midwest, rather
than do business with traitorous "border state submissionists." Eager to preserve
lucrative market relationships, East Tennessee boosters reminded their secessionist
neighbors that the bread served on their tables, the com fed to their slaves, and the hams
hanging in their smokehouses owed their existence, by and large, to the efforts of East
Tennessee farmers. "See if we can't live without your money as long as you can do
without meat and bread," the Whig boasted, adding that "you are now getting your
supplies from Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana, via Nashville. Are these States more friendly to
Secession . . . than Tennessee?"70
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As if to prove East Tennesseans' point, communities across the Deep South soon
ran short of foodstuffs. On March 30, the Whig expressed tongue-in-cheek regret that
that charitable organizations in the "boasted Southern Confederacy" were subjecting
themselves to "the humiliation . . . of . . . going into Black Republican States, and

soliciting charities in the shape of bread, com, and socks." Perhaps Brownlow overstated
the severity of this subsistence crisis. Recent scholarship demonstrates that Black Belt
planters produced an abundance of grain and livestock for local consumption. Still, by
spring 1 86 1 food shortages forced leaders in the Deep South to acknowledge one simple,
galling fact: feeding their citizens without the benefit of East Tennessee produce would
require a substantial reordering of agricultural priorities. To the Whig's delight, editors
in Georgia and Alabama began urging planters "to reduce their crops of Cotton, and to
plant CORN, so as to become independent of the grain-growing . . . border States and the
Republicans of the North-Western states."7 1
Sectional tensions increased through the spring of 1 86 1 , casting a shadow of
uneasiness across East Tennessee. Economic concerns were soon relegated to secondary
importance as boosters stopped to consider their perilous geopolitical circumstances.
From his desk at the Whig, Parson Brownlow reminded readers that "fighting is to be
done, and that at no distant day, and the battle ground is to be along the line of the border
States of Maryland, Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri." Thus caught between
the two sections, both physically and politically, East Tennesseans tried in vain to steer a
neutral course. In a speech to the Committee for Workingmen of Philadelphia, Unionist
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Horace Maynard attempted to explain his region's seemingly contradictory political
stance. He first vouched for East Tennesseans' deep devotion to the Union, insisting that
"it is not in the pluribus, but in the unum of our national motto that our national strength
lies." Maynard nevertheless made it clear that his fellow highlanders believed in state
sovereignty, particularly as it applied to slavery. If Northerners disliked slavery, he
insisted, "such is their right to not have it."72
Unfortunately, East Tennesseans were not to have their wish. On April 1 2, 1 86 1 ,
Confederate forces opened fire on Fort Sumter in Charleston, South Carolina, plunging
the nation into civil war. Like many of their countrymen north as well as south, East
Tennesseans were "amazed, staggered, and bewildered" by the news. More astonishing,
however, was the political reversal that swept the state in the aftermath of the
bombardment. On April 1 5, Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers to "put down
'combinations' in seven states 'too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings. '" Tennesseans, even those who had voted no in the February
referendum, responded coolly to the President's request. In an effort to shore up Unionist
sentiment, East Tennessee political leaders urged their constituents to hold fast. Temple
denounced the bombardment, insisting· that "it constituted another and higher reason for
standing by the government." Unionists were forced to watch helplessly, however, as
secessionism swept the state. "Conditional Unionists," among them many East
Tennesseans, withdrew their tenuous support of the Lincoln Administration, and
reluctantly embraced the Confederacy. Taking advantage of this shift in public opinion,
Harris entered the state into a military league with the Confederacy on May 7, 1 86 1 .
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Though Tennessee would remain in the Union formally until June 8, its course had been
set; the state was committed practically to the cause of Southern independence. 73
Soon after Tennessee's entry into the military league, Confederate soldiers
became a common sight on the streets of Knoxville. On May 29 the Register reported
"some eighteen or twenty-one companies (some of them not full) in camp . . . near
Knoxville, and a number of other companies in different portions of East Tennessee . . .
sufficient to compose . . . three regiments." These soldiers were, at first, local men,
recruited from the towns and farms of East Tennessee. Soon, however, these troops were
joined by units from the Deep South on their way to reinforce the Confederate army in
northern Virginia. By August an estimated 12,000 soldiers camped in Knoxville's public
spaces, more than doubling the city's prewar population. Residents were awed by the
number of soldiers in their midst. On August 27 a Register reporter offered this
humorously exaggerated report: "A train of cars, which seemed to have no end to it, and
loaded down with troops, arrived here Saturday evening from Georgia, and from various
estimates made of their number, we suppose there were a million, more or less, of
them. "74
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Not surprisingly, the sudden influx of Confederate soldiers into this divided
region sparked political violence. Rambunctious young soldiers clashed repeatedly with
Unionist civilians, threatening to transform communities along the region's railroads into
war zones. One such incident occurred at Strawberry Plains,a depot town seventeen
miles northeast of Knoxville. On May 5 a crowd of 800-1,200 Unionists gathered for a
political rally on a farm adjacent to the East Tennessee & Virginia Railroad. As the rally
began,a troop train laden with Alabama Confederates steamed slowly by,affording two
soldiers perched atop the cars an opportunity to fire pistol shots at the crowd. Enraged
Unionists fired back,and as the train sped away,the crowd swarmed over the tracks,
threatening to burn the 1,600 foot Holston River trestle. Though no one was hurt and no
damage was done,the incident heightened the animosity between Unionists and their
Confederate "guests. " Those in attendance issued a defiant message,assuring military
authorities that "we can never be driven or coerced into abject or unmanly submission. "7 5
Political violence aside,however,the onset of Confederate occupation does not
appear to have had a substantial impact on valley residents. Military authorities and
Unionist leaders maintained an uneasy detente through the summer of 1 86 1 . General
Felix Zollicoffer,appointed commander of the Confederate District of East Tennessee on
July 26,extended an olive branch to Unionists. A longtime Knoxville resident,
Zollicoffer understood the region's political divisions. Consequently,he sought to
reassure Unionists that "the Military authorities are not here to offend or injure the
people, but to insure peace in their homes, by repelling invasion and preventing the
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introduction of the horrors of civil war." Brownlow, for one, responded warmly to
Zollicoffer's overtures, praising him as "a man of fine sense, of great fairness of
character, and of true courage." Moreover, the Whig encouraged readers to obey the new
commander, insisting that "he is really desirous of avoiding any collisions with the
people of East Tennessee--and if he is not successful, it will not be his fault."76
Agricultural production continued unabated, with valley farmers producing more
than enough grain and livestock to feed the newly expanded population. For his part,
Zollicoffer attempted to curb foraging, forbidding his soldiers to seize provisions
arbitrarily. On August 3 the Whig reported that "the com crop was never more promising
. . . the wheat harvest is over, and nearly all accounts agree that the yield is good . . . . Hay
was never better, and never more abundant." A reports one month later was equally
optimistic: "We are pleased to say that never in all our life, have we seen so fine a crop
of com. . . . There will be more com raised . . . than will supply the country for two
years." Unfortunately, torrential October rains brought heavy flooding to the region's
principal rivers, destroying some crops not yet harvested. According to the Whig. rising
waters on the French Broad, Holston, Nolichucky, and Watauga rivers inundated farms,
sweeping away "com, fodder, oats, pumpkins, fence-rails, mills, stables, and all manner
of farm buildings, including some houses." Still, Temple insisted that the 1 86 1 harvest
"was a fair one," sufficient, at least, to ensure demographic stability.77
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If valley residents felt the impact of occupation at all, it was in their pocketbooks.
Commercial activity and industrial development were severely curtailed as Confederate
authorities used railroads, machine shops, foundries, and raw materials in military
production. Economically speaking, it was as if the region had reverted in time to 1854,
prior to the advent of rail service. Confederate troop and supply trains monopolized the
railroads, leaving precious little room for civilian traffic. On October 1 2 the Whig
complained that "hundreds of car-loads of sugar, salt, molasses, fuel, meat, and all kinds
of provisions" sat idly in the region's depots, "unable to reach their destination, by reason
of . . . those in charge of the roads." To make matters worse, Confederate quartermasters
impressed civilians' wagons, further inhibiting the flow of commercial goods. According
to the Reverend Thomas Humes, "many articles in frequent or habitual use . . . could not
be had at any price, or if at all, only in the smallest quantities. Coffee, which formerly
could be bought at from 14 to 1 6 cents a pound . . . sold at one dollar a pound. Salt,
almost a necessity of life, could only be obtained with difficulty, and its price of 2 ½ and
3 cents a pound, rose to 30 cents or more."78
As commerce and industry declined, jobs, particularly in the skilled trades, grew
scarce. "If any one of the Mechanics of [Knoxville] has a job on hand, or one in
prospect," the Whig observed, "we have not heard the case." Confederate authorities
encouraged those engaged in militarily useful pursuits (and who expressed secessionist
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sympathies) to expand their operations,thus providing a limited number of
manufacturing jobs. Knoxville machinist A. L. Maxwell did a bustling wartime business,
producing weapons and repairing army wagons in his newly renovated facilities. Tanners
thrived as well,owing to the demand for leather goods created by the occupation force.
Like Maxwell,tanner J. S. Van Gilder took advantage of this unique opportunity for
personal enrichment,establishing a near-monopoly over the East Tennessee leather trade.
Van Gilder provided a degree of relief for the unemployed,hiring boot and shoemakers
with the promise of "liberal wages. "79
This economic downturn disturbed Knoxville boosters who had devoted time and
energy to establishing trade routes and encouraging outside investment. Particularly
galling was the flight of "industrious and enterprising citizens," most of whom were
skilled Northern immigrants seeking to escape Confederate rule. Unable to stem this
exodus of labor and capital,boosters vented their frustrations in local newspapers. On
July 6,the Whig lamented the rapid decay of Knoxville's once-booming economy:
"Secession may have been a great blessing to some of the towns in the Cotton States,but
it has been the ruin of this place. It has destroyed business of every kind,reduced the
price of real estate fully one half,and thrown almost every laboring man out of employ. "
By September, few among the city's merchant and laboring classes could afford to pay
peacetime rents,and a wave of foreclosures swept the city. To the chagrin of boosters,
Knoxville and hence the region,seemed poised to lose all that it had achieved
economically and demographically since 1855. "Our once- growing town," the Whig
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observed darkly, "has received a backset, from which . . . it will not recover in the next
ten years."80
Despite their suffering, valley residents enjoyed a reasonable degree of
demographic stability through 1 86 1 . If anything, the onset of Confederate occupation
created conditions not unlike a severe economic depression; disappointing to boosters,
perhaps, but of no real consequence to a people accustomed to frugality and self
sustenance. Valley farmers raised more than enough grain and livestock to feed the
civilian and military population. As of 1 859, 1 50,91 4 individuals inhabited the eleven
counties traversed by the East Tennessee & Virginia and East Tennessee & Georgia
Railroads. Together they produced 256,275 hogs or 1 . 7 per consumer; 88,286 cattle, or
0.5 per consumer; 1 ,476, 1 40 bushels of wheat, or 9.7 bushels per consumer; and
6,683,301 bushels of com, or 44.2 bushels per consumer. Although the number of
Confederate soldiers occupying these counties fluctuated throughout the war,
contemporary sources agree that between 2,000 and 4,000 guarded the railroads at any
given time. If we add 4,000 soldiers to the existing civilian population,
foodstuff/consumer ratios scarcely waver. The hog/consumer ratio drops to 1 .6, the
cattle/consumer ratio remains at 0.5, the wheat/consumer ratio drops to 9.5, and the
corn/consumer ratio drops to 43.0. So long as valley farmers maintained normal
production levels, there was little danger of soldiers or civilians experiencing food
shortages. 8 1
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The same could not be said for residents of the rugged Cumberland tableland,
particularly those in Anderson, Scott, Claiborne, Campbell, and Union Counties. It was
here, ironically, amid the hardscrabble farms of the region's most demographically
fragile sub-region, that Confederate authorities in Knoxville chose to station the bulk of
their troops early in the war. The reasons for this were simple. Viewed from above,
these five counties form an inverted triangle, the point of which rests on the Clinch River
adjacent to Knox County, and the base of which constitutes the entire East Tennessee
Kentucky border. To the north, the Cumberland Mountains provided Confederate
strategists with a natural redoubt from which to repel Union invaders. Few roads--and no
railroads other than that which connected Clinton with Knoxville--traversed this five
county area. These few that did were exceedingly poor, ill-suited to withstand the rigors
posed by artillery, supply wagons, and the tramp of thousands of feet. Moreover, these
roads entered the state through a series of narrow, easily defensible gaps, chief among
them Big Creek Gap in Campbell County and the Gibraltar of East Tennessee,
Cumberland Gap in Claiborne County. Union invaders seeking to enter the region from
Kentucky would be funneled through one of these gaps, straight into the rifle sights of
waiting Confederates. 82
As we have seen, agricultural production on the tableland suffered from serious
limitations prior to the Confederate occupation. Decades of com monoculture had
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depleted the soil,resulting in ever-diminishing crop yields. Land scarcity and
overcrowding had compounded the problem,particularly after 1855,producing a zone of
demographic fragility. Surprisingly,foodstuff/consumer ratios in the five tableland
counties differed little from those in the central valley,except as regards wheat. As of the
1860 census,33,059 people lived in these counties,producing a total of 68,8 10 hogs,or
2.0 per consumer; 23,0 16 cattle,or 0.6 per consumer; 130,414 bushels of wheat,or 3.9
bushels per consumer; and 1,4 16,286 bushels of corn,or 43.0 bushels per person. The
problem,then,was one of logistics. In the valley,Confederate soldiers had access to
railroads and navigable rivers,and hence to supply depots in the Deep South and
Virginia. Those stationed on the tableland had neither,forcing them to depend on slow
moving wagons trains for foodstuffs and equipment. Faced with constant shortages and
surrounded by a hostile population,Confederate soldiers on the tableland were quick to
pillage local farms.83
Zollicoffer attempted to curb indiscriminate foraging,ordering that none other
than quartermasters and commissary agents be allowed to impress civilian goods and
livestock. Evidence suggests,however,that isolated units often ignored such orders. A
soldier en route to Cumberland Gap described his comrades' tendency to do so. "I saw
nothing strange on the route," he insisted,"except the remarkable fondness for chickens
and fresh meat which began to manifest itself among the troops. " It is difficult to
imagine either of these men shying away from the occasional,illicit foraging expedition.
Nathaniel E. Harris of the 63 rd Tennessee noted in his memoir that he "did not approve of
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foraging, but found it was impossible to keep such a feeling in mind .... Very scant
rations were issued.. .. We generally tried to supplement them by buying provisions . . .
and when this failed we resorted to foraging. "84
Despite the myriad problems arising from the occupation, a peculiar calm
descended over East Tennessee during the summer of 1861. On June 14, Unionists
convened the Greeneville Convention, the goal of which was to formulate a plan of
resistance to Confederate rule. Though some in attendance advocated the use of force,
specifically "the formation of military companies ...in every county and civil district, "
the Unionists voted instead to pursue a peaceable course of action. Delegates were
dispatched from Greeneville to Nashville, there to request that the General Assembly
allow the thirty-one counties composing East Tennessee, as well as "such other counties
in Middle Tennessee as desire to cooperate with them, " to secede from the state. The
request was promptly denied. Still, Oliver P.Temple insisted that the convention
succeeded, primarily because it discouraged East Tennesseans from taking up arms
against the Confederate government. "On the adjournment of the Convention, " he
pointed out, "there was a short lull in the stormy excitement among the Union people.. ..
They at once began to resume their usual and peaceful avocations . . . . Many were willing
... to remain at home in peace,quiet spectators in the great conflict in which they could
not follow their patriotic instincts. "85
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Unfortunately,a series of ill-conceived Confederate policies shattered this calm,
precipitating a wave of partisan violence and civilian flight that shook the region to its
foundations. On August 14,Confederate President Jefferson Davis issued a proclamation
ordering all male U. S. citizens over fourteen years of age to leave Confederate territory
within forty days. The region's secessionist minority took this as their cue to persecute
Unionist neighbors,creating "quite an excitement " among the civilian population. Eager
to restore calm, Brownlow urged Unionists to ignore the order and remain at home. After
all,East Tennesseans qualified as Confederate citizens, regardless of their political
affiliations. Zollicoffer joined Brownlow,insisting that "no act or word will be tolerated
calculated to alarm . .. those who heretofore advocating the Federal Union . . . now . . .
submit to the Government of the Confederate States. " Unconvinced,several thousand
Unionists dodged Confederate patrols and escaped to Kentucky. As of September 28, an
estimated 2,000 East Tennesseans--most of whom intended to don Yankee blue and
return home as liberators--were encamped at Camp Dick Robinson,a Union military base
near Danville,Kentcuky. 86
Those Unionists who remained soon discovered that Zollicoffer's promises meant
little to their secessionist neighbors. The more rabid of the region's Confederate
sympathizers had long since lost patience with the commander,citing his decision to deal
kindly with Unionists as a sign of weakness. In September,Confederate general Albert
Sydney Johnston ordered Zollicoffer and the bulk of his troops north to Cumberland Gap,
there to repel an anticipated Union invasion from Kentucky. Taking advantage of his
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absence,secessionists and ill-disciplined soldiers unleashed what Temple termed a "reign
of terror " against Unionists, subjecting them to interrogation, false arrest,and
imprisonment. Zollicoffer's subordinates in Knoxville were unable, if not in fact
unwilling, to curb secessionist excesses. Thomas Humes placed Col. William Wood
among the chief culprits,insisting that "his zeal . .. did not leave room enough in his
mind for the exercise of discretion,which is said to be the better part of valor." Among
other incidents, soldiers under Wood's command brawled repeatedly with Knoxville
policemen, driving the "frightened guardians of the municipality " from the city. Rather
than punish his wayward charges,however,the colonel flooded the city with soldiers in
an attempt to intimidate Unionists. 8 7
Unbeknownst to East Tennesseans,one of the many Unionist refugees,Rev.
William B. Carter, intended to put an end to this persecution. 88 Soon after fleeing the
region in July,Carter traveled to Washington D. c.; in the hope of securing military aid
for his beleaguered homeland. President Lincoln, Secretary of State William Seward,
and Gen. George B. McClellan agreed to a private meeting, during which Carter
proposed a daring scheme for liberating East Tennessee. The first phase of his plan
called for Unionist partisans to destroy bridges on the East Tennessee & Georgia and East
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Tennessee & Virginia Railroads, thereby disrupting Confederate supply lines. The
second phase called for Union troops in eastern Kentucky to invade the region, defeating
the paralyzed rebels and capturing Knoxville. Having sought for some time to relieve
East Tennessee's loyalist population, Lincoln approved the scheme at once. Seward and
McClellan offered their support as well, with "Little Mac " pledging to "keep the
Confederate army in Virginia so busy that it could not send troops to East Tennessee to
aid in defending the lines of communication. " His mission thus accomplished, Carter set
out for home. With luck, the Union flag would, by Christmas, fly once again over his
beloved East Tennessee. 89
On the night of November 8, 1861, Carter and an unknown number of Unionist
partisans sprang into action. The conspirators converged on railroad bridges throughout
the central valley, destroying two on the East Tennessee & Virginia line between
Knoxville and Bristol, as well as two more over Chickamauga Creek just south of
Chattanooga. They attempted to burn the 1,600-foot trestle at Strawberry Plains, but
were thwarted by the determined resistance of a lone Confederate sentry. Still, the attack
had been remarkably successful. Just as Carter had expected, Confederate authorities
panicked, expecting at any moment to be overrun by armed Unionist bands. Moreover,
the loss of the railroad bridges served to cut rebel supply lines, preventing them from
rushing troops into the region from southwest Virginia and north Georgia. The deed thus
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accomplished, Carter and his fellow bridge-burners turned their eyes expectantly toward
Kentucky, and to the blue-clad columns poised just north of the border. 90
Unfortunately for the conspirators, General William T. Sherman had postponed
the invasion on November 5, three days before the bridge burnings. To Sherman,
sending unseasoned troops through the Cumberland Mountains, with the bulk of
Zollicoffer' s forces occupying Cumberland and Big Creek Gaps, seemed a recipe for
disaster. Although written nearly two years later, a report issued by Union colonel
Samuel Gilbert, in which he discussed the logistical support needed for a 5,000-man
attack on Cumberland Gap, sheds light on Sherman's reluctance to invade East
Tennessee. According to Gilbert, the nearest Union supply depot lay at Nicholasville,
Kentucky, 1 20 miles north of the gap. The farms between these two points having been
depleted by foragers, the invaders would have to transport foodstuffs, fodder,
ammunition, and other supplies via mule train over abysmal roads. Given these
conditions, Gilbert estimated that he would need 924 wagons and 5,544 mules, traveling
in sixteen-day circuits, just to move the small army to Cumberland Gap. Accumulating a
supply surplus would require an additional 924 wagons, not to mention the draft animals
needed to pull them. · Moreover, Gilbert would need extra wagons and mules to replace
those that broke down, as well as a cavalry force to guard the long supply line. Feeding
and re-supplying this force would require yet more wagons, ammunition, and fodder,
further diminishing the operation's practicality.9 1
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East Tennessee Unionists were thus left to the mercy of their Confederate
occupiers, and mercy was in short supply. From his camp near the Kentucky border,
Zollicoffer made it clear that the Unionist/secessionist detente was at an end. "[Unionist]
leaders, " he insisted, "should be seized and held as prisoners. The leniency shown them
has been unavailing. They have acted with duplicity and should no longer be trusted. "
With this, military authorities in Knoxville moved to crush what they assumed was a
region-wide uprising. Col. William Wood declared martial law in Knoxville, ordering
his men to search Unionist homes for weapons and other contraband. According to
Humes, "the people's houses were arbitrarily entered day and night .. . and their guns
and pistols demanded. " Soon after, General William H. Carroll arrived with
reinforcements from Georgia, Middle Tennessee, and West Tennessee, which he
dispatched to suspected trouble spots throughout the region. Soldiers arrested those
suspected of partisan activity, seized foodstuffs, and, in extreme cases, executed
"saboteurs. " In all, the rebels hanged four suspected bridge-burners and confined an
additional 1,200 "conspirators " in squalid Southern prisons. 92
In the aftermath of the bridge burnings, the centrifuge that was East Tennessee
accelerated rapidly. Valley residents, once shielded from the centrifugal forces
emanating from the Confederate occupation, now found it difficult to maintain their grip
on hearth and home. Among those who fled the region that autumn was Parson
Brownlow, outspoken editor of the Knoxville Whig. Brownlow abruptly went off to
Sevier County several days before the bridge-burnings, arousing suspicion among
92
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secessionists that he had participated in the plot. Eager to clear his name, the parson
returned secretly to Knoxville, met with Carroll, and received permission to seek asylum
in the north. Before he could leave, however, secessionists acting under the authority of
Confederate district attorney John Crozier Ramsey arrested him. Lacking evidence,
Ramsey released Brownlow several weeks later, whereupon he was promptly re-arrested
by military authorities. Fortunately for the parson, Carroll's successor, Maj. Gen. George
B. Crittenden, sympathized with his plight and ordered him escorted to Union lines. 93
Meanwhile, the subsistence/demographic crisis on the Cumberland tableland
intensified with each passing day. Zollicoffer's 4,000-man force had been poised on the
Tennessee-Kentucky border (mostly in Claiborne and Campbell counties), since
September. During that time, foragers made regular excursions into the countryside,
impressing hogs, chickens, cattle, horses, wagons, and grain from local farmers. Per
Zollicoffer' s orders, foraging parties issued farmers vouchers in exchange for
"purchased " goods. With winter fast approaching, however, civilians needed food for
their families and animals, not Confederate scrip. Adding to the subsistence burden were
8,000 Union soldiers under the command of Gen. George H. Thomas, stationed just south
of Barboursville, Kentucky. Although they benefited from supply depots in Lexington
and Danville, Thomas' s troops doubtless supplemented their rations by purchasing or
pilfering produce from highland farmers. Cavalrymen and teamsters proved particularly
burdensome to civilians. U. S. army regulations stipulated that horses and mules get half
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of their daily nutrition from local sources, forcing horsemen to make daily excursions,
sometimes covering fifty miles or more, in search of hay and grain.94
Into this chaotic situation stepped Confederate general Edmund Kirby Smith, a
Floridian who, as an outsider, possessed only a vague understanding of the region's
volatile social and political climate. Predisposed to distrust East Tennesseans, even those
professing secessionist sympathies, he nonetheless attempted to curb military
depredations, halt the exodus of Unionist refugees, and stabilize the region. Smith had
his work cut out for him. Arriving in Knoxville on March 8, 1862, the new commander
found the region in a state of utter disarray. Confederate operations in the region had
suffered a major setback when, on January 19, Zollicoffer was killed and his army routed
at the battle of Mill Springs, Kentucky. Following the battle, the battered rebels returned
to East Tennessee, whereupon individual units dispersed throughout the region and began
acting independently of higher authority. Zollicoffer's immediate successors, including
the hard-drinking Crittenden, had done little to restore order. Smith, however, acted
decisively, moving to reestablish control over isolated units and ordering them to
concentrate at railroad bridges and geographic strong-points. He then ordered East
Tennessee units, many of which had participated in the Mill Springs debacle (and whose
loyalty he thus questioned), sent beyond the region's borders.95
Having regained control over Confederate forces in the region, Smith moved to
stem the tide of Unionist refugees. First, he increased cavalry patrols on the Cumberland
tableland and in the Holston River Valley, the two most popular avenues of escape. He
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then declared a blanket amnesty for Unionist refugees, Union military personnel
included, who were willing to return home and resume their occupations. Still, Smith
made it clear that there were limits to his generosity. Unionist exiles had to return home
within thirty days; the families of those who failed to do so would be expelled from
Confederate territory. Furthermore, those who fled north following the issuance of the
proclamation could expect to have their families sent immediately to Kentucky. Though
Smith made good on his threat in certain cases, expelling the families of exiled Unionists
Andrew Johnson, Horace Maynard, and Parson Brownlow from the region, he stopped
short of wholesale deportation. No doubt Smith restrained himself because, as Humes
remarked, marching "an army of women and children from East Tennessee over
mountains and rivers into Kentucky . . . would have sent a thrill of amazement akin to
horror throughout enlightened Christendom," and would thus have been
counterproductive to his cause. 96
To curb excess foraging, Smith attempted to revamp the region's supply system.
Given the poor state of transportation infrastructure, however, this proved a daunting
task. Like most other Southern railroads, the East Tennessee & Virginia and East
Tennessee & Georgia deteriorated badly during the occupation. According to historian
John Clark, soft iron rails and wheels, the products of imperfect iron-making techniques,
warped under the stress of heavy military traffic. Smith could thus do little to effect
long-term repairs. Southern foundries produced just 16,072 tons of iron in 1860, far less
than the estimated 50,000 tons needed annually to repair railroads in the region.
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Production increased during the war,but never exceeded 20,000 tons in any year.
Consequently, East Tennessee railroad maintenance often took the form of stop-gap
efforts,such as those witnessed by Isaac L. Thomas of the 25 th Virginia Cavalry. After
traveling from Bristol to Knoxville in 1862,Thomas wrote: "our horses were put in the
cars and we on top to make the trip to Knoxville. We had a tedious trip. The railroad
was bad and the cars old and worn,so repairs had to be made at nearly every station. "97
Ultimately, Smith's efforts would be in vain. On April 16, 1862,the Confederate
Congress approved conscription,destroying what little goodwill remained between East
Tennesseans and military authorities in Knoxville. Under the provisions of this act, all
males aged eighteen to thirty-five were subject to military service, regardless of their
political affiliations. No longer, it seems,would Unionists be allowed to sit out the
conflict in peace,firm in their determination to "never under any circumstances . .. fire a
hostile shot at the flag of their country. " East Tennessee men (including,ironically,a
large number of secessionists) thus faced a difficult decision: accept their fate and don
Confederate gray,or flee the region, possibly to enlist in the Union army. According to
Temple,the vast majority chose the latter course. He wrote: "Now began a general
exodus of Union men. . . . Immediately,the minds of almost the entire male population,
of age for military duty, were turned toward Kentucky. As fast as they could procure
guides and companions,they silently slipped away on their perilous journey. " In some
cases,communities lost nearly their entire adult male population. Five hundred men
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reportedly fled New Market in one night, leaving wives, children, and the aged to fend
for themselves. 98
It is difficult to determine the exact number of East Tennesseans who left the
region, either as soldiers or refugees, between 1861 and 1862. Confederate military
authorities kept imperfect records of enlistees, and scholars disagree on how many East
Tennesseans served in the Union ranks. Complicating matters are the tens of thousands
of refugees and political prisoners who fled during this period, leaving no record of their
departure. What we do know is this: approximately 25,000 East Tennesseans joined, or
were conscripted into, the Confederate army, while between 30,000 and 40,000 donned
Union blue. An additional 4,000 noncombatants were imprisoned by Confederate
authorities (some of whom subsequently died). As for refugees, Humes insisted that by
the spring of 1863 "more than one-eighth of the entire population were withdrawn . . .
from tilling the soil. " Humes's figure, however, is much too low. One-eighth of East
Tennessee's prewar population (29 1,5 14) amounts to just 36,439 individuals, only
slightly higher than the most conservative estimate of Union volunteers alone. It is
therefore possible that as many as 70,000 to 75,000 East Tennesseans left the region, and
thus withdrew their labor from agricultural production, between 1861 and 1863 . 99
Smith's successors also attempted to stem the tide of refugees and ensure
continued agricultural production. On assuming command of the Department of East
Tennessee in October 1862, Gen. Sam Jones sought to suspend conscription, at least long
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enough to allow farmers time to complete the fall harvest. Besides, recruiting efforts
were at last bearing fruit: two new East Tennessee regiments composed entirely of
volunteers were by then ready to be mustered into active service. Although Jones
expressed little sympathy for Unionists who dodged conscription, he was convinced that
"men who are so averse to entering the military service that they flee their homes and
conceal themselves in the mountains to avoid it would be far more serviceable to the
Government in the corn and wheat fields . . . than in the ranks." Despite the general's
repeated appeals to Secretary of War George W. Randolph, however, the Richmond
government refused to rescind conscription in East Tennessee. Hard-pressed for
manpower, the Confederate Congress actually broadened the Conscription Act, raising
the upper age limit from thirty-five to forty-five years. 1 00
Consider also the policies of General Simon Buckner, who arrived in Knoxville
on April 27, 1 863. In a letter to Confederate adjutant general Samuel Cooper, Buckner
insisted that conscription had accomplished little in East Tennessee, other than to create a
vicious cycle of hunger and partisan violence threatening to his command. He told
Cooper: "Large numbers of [Unionists], to avoid conscription, have fled their homes and
are lurking in the mountains, the woods, and the caves . . . . Many of these men, rendered
desperate by their situation, are infesting the roads . . . and, urged by necessity and a spirit
of revenge and bitterness, are stealing horses and destroying the cattle, hogs, and products
within their reach." Like Jones, Buckner sought clemency for those willing to return to
their farms, as well as a six-month suspension of conscription. The new commander
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made it clear,however,that he would tolerate no further acts of rebellion against
Confederate authority in the region. "To such as refuse to avail themselves of these
privileges," he suggested, "a severe policy should be pursued . . . . They should be
considered as enemy aliens . . . and when captured regarded as prisoners of war. " 1 01
Evidence suggests that these efforts met with a startling degree of success,at least
in the central valley. According to Temple,"the . . . crops of 1 862 and 1 863 were
unprecedented in quantity. They were simply enormous. . . . Nothing like it had been
known for a long time. The fields literally groaned with the teeming abundance of wheat
and corn. " Still, Temple's assessment of these two harvests must be viewed with caution.
Travel restrictions would have prevented him from conducting a region-wide agricultural
survey,thus limiting his perspective to the relatively stable communities of the French
Broad and Holstonffennessee River valleys. Surrounded as he was by verdant stands of
wheat and corn,it would have been easy for Temple to overlook the demographic chaos
occurring on the Cumberland tableland. 1 02
In truth, the summer of 1 863 saw East Tennessee teetering on the brink of
economic and demographic collapse. Men by the tens of thousands had fled the region,
creating a labor shortage crippling to agricultural production. It was, quite literally,as if
the combined human population of Campbell,Claiborne,Anderson,Union, Scott,
Hancock,Johnson,Meigs,Polk,Sequatchie,and Bradley counties had disappeared,
leaving farms abandoned. In their place,an estimated 1 2,000 to 25,000 Confederate
soldiers impressed grain and draft animals at an alarming rate while contributing little,if
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anything,to the regional food supply. Though farm women and children made Herculean
efforts to continue production,their prospects for success diminished with each passing
day. Lacking physical strength and draft animals,they were unable to prepare the land
adequately for planting. Observers thus expected a small harvest,amounting to "not over
one-third the usual product." With human foodstuffs expected to be in such short supply,
East Tennesseans had little choice but to withhold nutrition from their remaining
livestock. Across the region,food animals and draft animals decreased in weight,
diminishing their reproductive capabilities and limiting their effectiveness as a source of
agricultural labor.103
As fall approached,exiled Unionists pleaded with Military Governor Andrew
Johnson to help secure an immediate invasion of East Tennessee. Should Confederate
forces be allowed to seize the upcoming harvest,they reasoned,the region might well
experience famine. Writing from London,Kentucky,on June 11, 1863, Robert A.
Crawford informed Johnson that "the wheat crop is better than it has been for five years
before." He then asked angrily,"are the damed [sic] Rebels to have this wheat crop? "
Johnson himself could do little to influence Union military operations in Tennessee.
Still,help seemed on the way when General William S. Rosecrans's Army of the
Cumberland set forth from Murfreesboro on June 24,intent on driving General Braxton
Bragg's Confederate Army of Tennessee from the state and capturing Chattanooga. By
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July 2, the Yankees had moved as far south as Tullahoma, raising Unionists' hopes of a
quick liberation. However, Rosecrans's meticulous nature, as well as his desire to rest
his men, stalled the anny. It was not until August 16 that "Old Rosy" renewed the
advance, much too late to save the fall harvest in East Tennessee. For the second time in
as many years, fanners watched helplessly as the fruits of their labor disappeared into
Confederate forage wagons. 1 04
Still, East Tennesseans had reason to be hopeful. On June 14, ten days before
Rosecrans set out for Tullahoma, a raiding party of 1,500 Union cavalrymen commanded
by Col. William P. Sanders swept southward into the region from Kentucky, disrupting
Confederate supply lines and paving the way for a general invasion. The raiders were
remarkably successful. Between June 14 and 26, they captured the Confederate garrison
at Wartburg in Morgan County, tore up the East Tennessee & Georgia Railroad north of
Loudon, and engaged the Knoxville garrison in a spirited artillery duel. Unable to
capture the city, the raiders continued northeast up the Holston River Valley, burning
railroad bridges and tearing up track. In all, the Yankees destroyed three trestles along
the East Tennessee & Virginia line, including the 1,600-foot span at Strawberry Plains.
Their work completed, Sanders and his men returned to Kentucky, leaving civilians and
their Confederate "guests " to ponder the implications of the raid. Although fearing
retribution similar to that which followed the bridge burnings, Knoxville Unionists
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remained outwardly calm. "When the excitement ...passed," Humes insisted,the city
"returned to its former quiet condition and remained so for two months. " 1 05
This "quiet condition" would not last. On August 16,Union general Ambrose
Burnside and his 15,000-man Army of the Ohio embarked on the much-anticipated
invasion of upper East Tennessee. Heading south from Camp Nelson, Kentucky,the
Yankees discovered quickly why Sherman had once balked at the prospect of invading
the region. Road conditions deteriorated rapidly as the army entered the Cumberland
Mountains,slowing the advance to a crawl. Corporal John Watkins of the 5 th Ohio
Battery wrote: "Such a road as we came over I have never heard of before or want to
hear of again. I don't believe there is another such road in the Confederacy. If there is,it
ought to be blocked up forever." Teamsters and artillerists were forced to help mules and
horses drag supply wagons and caissons over the steep grades. Hundreds of exhausted
animals died in their traces,or were killed when wagons tumbled into ravines. The men
fared little better. Razor-sharp rock outcroppings cut away shoe soles, leaving many of
the soldiers barefoot. To make matters worse,the farms of the Cumberland tableland
offered little in the way of food or forage,forcing Burnside to place the army on half
rations. Not surprisingly, the hungry soldiers responded much as their Confederate
predecessors had to similar command decisions, stealing livestock and grain from
farms.106
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Confederate authorities in Knoxville panicked as word of Burnside's advance
trickled into the city. According to Temple, "a little after the middle of August, [the
rebels] commenced shipping Southward, in great haste, all their supplies of every
description. Everything that could be transported to another place was moved. " Seeking
to position himself between the two advancing Union armies, Buckner abandoned
Knoxville and moved the bulk of his forces south to Kingston. The remainder
(approximately 4,000 men) were sent to Bristol and Cumberland Gap, leaving Knoxville
defenseless against bandits and partisan raiders. Residents soon discovered that
governmental structure, even when provided by one's enemies, is often preferable to
anarchy. Temple wrote: "For the first time in my life I realized the importance of
govemment--of an ever-present power capable of giving protection. There was, for
nearly a week . . . no one in Knoxville with authority to . . . enforce an obedience to law. .
. . A straggling band of Scott's Louisiana Tigers remained behind. . . . These were the
only soldiers in Knoxville during these days of anxiety. . . . No one went out on the
streets unless forced to do so. The days were as the stillness of the Sabbath. " 1 07
As the Army of the Ohio struggled through the rough country northwest of
Knoxville, East Tennesseans held their breath. The Yankees had all but disappeared after
entering the Cumberland Mountains, leaving Unionists and secessionists alike to wonder
when, where, or even if they would emerge in the central valley. Given the
disproportionate suffering they had endured during the Confederate occupation, it is
perhaps fitting that Unionist farmers living on the Cumberland tableland were the first to
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greet the advancing columns. According to Temple, "women and children and old men .
. . flocked to the roadside to see the army, bringing with them such food as they had on
hand. Shouting and rejoicing . . . weeping and sobbing, and enthusiastic praise to God
for the great deliverance, everywhere greeted the army." Those in the valley, however,
had little other than rumors to sustain them. Having felt the sting of disappointment often
since 1 863, they worried that the Yankees might abandon the advance and return to
Kentucky. As the sun set on August 3 1 , there was nothing they could do but wait, watch,
and hope.108
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Chapter Three
"The Rebels robbed them, the Federals devoured them":
Union Occupation, Combat, and Demographic Collapse in East Tennessee

On September 1 , 1 863, Unionist 0. P. Temple made his way carefully through the
deserted streets of downtown Knoxville, arriving at the East Tennessee & Virginia
Railroad depot just before 3 :00 p.m. There he sat down to talk with J. B. Hoxie and John
R. Branner, the railroad's superintendent and president, respectively, hoping to gather
information about the Union Army of the Ohio's whereabouts. Unfortunately, the two
men had little to offer, leaving Temple "anxious, restless, and sick at heart. " His
dejection would be short-lived. From down the street, the drumming of hoof beats rose
in a gradual crescendo until it pounded like thunder against the walls of the depot.
Rushing outside, Temple was nearly trampled as Union cavalrymen, the lead element of
the Army of the Ohio, galloped past him and into the center of town. After two and a
half years of Confederate occupation, Knoxville had been liberated without a shot being
fired. Union general Ambrose E. Burnside would arrive with the army's main body two
days later, setting off a wave of jubilation. 1 09
Burnside's entry into Knoxville was like something out of an epic novel. The
scene was more befitting Caesar or Alexander than the bewhiskered commander
responsible for the Union debacle at Fredericksburg, Virginia. 1 1 0 As the general led his
blue-clad troops into the city, Unionists thronged the streets by the thousands, hoping to
catch a glimpse of their deliverer. Describing the joyous moment in his memoirs,
Thomas Humes wrote that Unionists "hailed [Burnside] as . . . the representative of their
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beloved nation, clothed with its authority and armed with its sword . . . . In the overflow
of their emotions they could have . . . drawn him in a carriage with their own hands all
over town, that everybody . . . might look upon him." Temple concurred. "All day
long," he wrote, "the people poured in a constant stream in the direction of his
headquarters, in order that they might have the chance of shaking hands with him."
Adding to Unionists' glee were the hundreds of East Tennessee soldiers found in the
army's ranks. In a poignant scene, "mothers, fathers, wives and sisters" smothered the
returned exiles with hugs, all the while shouting "Glory to God! glory to God! The army
has come." 1 1 1
Unionists had good reason to celebrate, or so they thought at the time. All around
them Union troops were on the move, scattering the hated Confederates and restoring
federal control to the region. On September 9, Burnside captured Cumberland Gap,
opening a direct, albeit inefficient, overland supply route between Lexington, Kentucky
and Knoxville. 1 1 2 Later that day, Union general Thomas Crittenden led a corps of Union
general William S. Rosecrans' Army of the Cumberland into Chattanooga, giving Union
forces control over one of the most important railroad hubs in the Confederacy. 1 1 3 From
Washington, Union general-in-chief Henry Halleck greeted the news with cautious
optimism; although congratulatory, he warned the two commanders to remain vigilant,
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lest one or both fall prey to a Confederate counterattack. Burnside,he insisted,should
"hold the gaps of the North Carolina mountains,the line of the Holston River,or some
point . . . to prevent [Confederate] access from Virginia,and connect with General
Rosecrans,at least with your cavalry. " Rosecrans,meanwhile,was to push on towards
Dalton,Georgia,cutting the Western and Atlantic Railroad at "some point " south of
Chattanooga and threatening Atlanta. "This being done," Halleck informed them both,
"it will be determined whether the movable forces shall advance into Georgia and
Alabama or into the valley of Virginia. " 1 1 4
Burnside moved quickly to comply. First,he sent an expedition into the Holston
River valley,the purpose of which was to seize control of the East Tennessee & Virginia
Railroad as far north as Bristol. Doing so would,as Halleck suggested, provide the Army
of the Ohio with an outpost against rebels in southwest Virginia. 1 1 5 It would also allow
Burnside to protect the farmers of the French Broad-Holston River country, on whom his
army would have to depend for subsistence--at least until Union engineers repaired the
East Tenpessee & Georgia Railroad. 1 16 Certain that his northern, or left flank,was
secure, Burnside turned his attention south. Again following Halleck' s orders, he sent
troops,among them most of his cavalry,to establish garrisons in Kingston, Loudon,and
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Athens. These troops were to guard and repair the East Tennessee & Georgia Railroad
between Knoxville and Chattanooga, as well as maintain contact with the Army of the
Cumberland. Although he had yet to devise a plan for securing the Tennessee-North
Carolina border, "Old Burnie" saw no reason to hurry. As historian William Marvel
points out, "the loyalists of East Tennessee had been liberated; the rebellion here seemed
over." 1 1 7
Rosecrans, meanwhile, threw caution to the wind. Convinced that the
Confederate Army of Tennessee was in full retreat, he pushed his divided forces deep
into the mountainous country of northwest Georgia. The only message that he sent to
Burnside was penned by Crittenden, and gave no indication of danger. It stated simply
that "the enemy has retreated in the direction of Rome, Ga. . . . The General commanding
the department requests that you . . . move down your cavalry and occupy the country
recently covered by Col. Minty." Confederate deserters, a number of whom entered
Union lines as the Army of the Cumberland advanced, served only to quicken Rosecrans'
pace. These "butternut �carecrows," as author Shelby Foote describes them, told graphic
tales of Confederate general Braxton Bragg's "demoralization," persuading Old Rosy that
his opponent was "in no condition to resist an attack if one could be thrown at him."
Thus it was that Rosecrans pressed on towards Dalton, without bothering to stop and
concentrate his forces. The road to Atlanta--perhaps even to the end of the war--lay just
to the west, and time was of the essence. 1 1 8
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Back in Knoxville, life soon resumed a pace not unlike that of the early days of
the Confederate occupation. The period of anarchy following Buckner's retreat had
come definitively to an end, and the city once again stood at the heart of a vast, highly
regimented military camp. Everywhere civilians looked, it seemed, there were soldiers,
wagons, draft animals, and the ubiquitous white army tents; the only noticeable
difference between the camps' new occupants and the rebels, aside from their
Midwestern and Northeastern accents, was the color of their uniforms. 1 1 9
Economically speaking, Knoxvillians were no better off--but certainly no worse-
in the early days of September 1863 than they had been under Confederate rule. In fact,
the presence of so many Union soldiers served to stimulate the local market, for most of
the Yankees carried at least a few federal greenbacks and were willing to exchange them
for supplemental rations. Those civilians fortunate enough to possess surplus foodstuffs
or consumer goods, and who were willing to part with them, sold them to soldiers at
highly inflated rates. According to Union corporal John Watkins, soldiers routinely paid
as much as $ 1.00 for a bushel of potatoes, $2.00 for a bushel of onions, sixty-five cents
for a pound of sugar, and twenty-five cents for a pound of butter. In some instances, the
soldiers' rations were more valuable than their currency. Coffee, in particular, was a
coveted commodity among Knoxvillians, and for the soldier willing to trade his away,a
sure means of acquiring foodstuffs. "The people around here," Watkins wrote to his
fiancee, "have neither coffee and but little tea since the war broke out and till we came
here. . .. You go to a man's house and ask him if he has any potatoes to sell or bacon and
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he will say no. then ask him if he has any to trade for coffee and he will say yes right
away if it is the last bushel he has got. . . . A person can get any thing they have got with
a little coffee. " 120
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the onset of Union occupation
brought with it a general, region-wide restoration of economic and demographic stability.
Quite the contrary was true. The great centrifuge continued its wild rotation that
September--perhaps even sped up a bit--tossing East Tennesseans into neighboring states
and further diminishing the region's agricultural labor force. The most obvious victims
of this continuing centrifugal force were, of course,secessionists; according to historian
W. Todd Groce,"hundreds, perhaps thousands " fled to Georgia, Virginia,and the
Carolinas, abandoning their farms. And yet Unionists continued to leave the region as
well, albeit now for much different reasons. Convinced that the Union conquest of East
Tennessee represented a permanent state of affairs, and that military authorities would
protect their families from guerillas, bandits, and Confederate raiders, Unionist partisans
emerged from hiding that fall and enlisted in the army en masse. Approximately 8,000
East Tennesseans donned Union blue between September and December 1863, most of
whom were subsequently sent north to Kentucky for equipping and training. 1 2 1
To make matters worse, an untold number of Unionist refugees huddled in
miserable poverty just north of the Kentucky border, refusing to return home despite the
restoration of Federal rule. Their reason for doing so was simple: although Union
soldiers controlled the larger communities of the central valley, they were too far away,
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and too few in number,to be of much help to those living on the region's rugged
geographic margins. Guerillas, bandits,and Confederate raiders continued to prowl these
areas with impunity,providing an effective check against repatriation. And then there
was the matter of food. On entering eastern Kentucky between 1 86 1 and 1 863,many
refugee families had squatted on abandoned farms. Since that time they had worked
diligently to cultivate small plots of corn and vegetables,and they were now able, barring
a major disaster,to survive the coming winter. Returning to East Tennessee in
September,well after the conclusion of planting season (and with little hope of Union
military protection), would have made no sense. And so they remained where they were,
at least for the time being,hoping against hope that the spring of 1 864 would bring better
days. 122
Given this state of affairs,Burnside faced a truly daunting problem: feeding his
1 5,000-man army in the midst of a mounting demographic/subsistence crisis. Union
soldiers consumed food just as quickly as had their Confederate predecessors, and may,
in fact,have done so at a faster rate. Recall that the Confederate occupying force
possessed a railroad network that,while highly inefficient,connected them to supply
depots in Virginia,the Carolinas,the Deep South,and,prior to the fall of Vicksburg in
July 1 863,the Trans-Mississippi west. The rebels were thus able to import foodstuffs
and supplies from outside the region,limiting (although certainly not eliminating) their
need to subsist at the expense of East Tennessee farmers. The Yankees in Chattanooga
and Knoxville were, by comparison, nearly bereft of functioning railroads. Confederate
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forces burned bridges on the Louisville & Nashville and East Tennessee & Georgia
Railroads (chief among them the trestles at Bridgeport,Alabama and Loudon, Tennessee)
during their August retreat, paralyzing both lines. Until these bridges could be repaired,
Union forces in East Tennessee would have to depend �lmost solely on local sources for
subsistence. 1 23
The only other ways to import foodstuffs were to haul them over the Cumberland
Mountains from eastern Kentucky or ship them upriver from Chattanooga aboard
steamboats. Neither of these options was, however,feasible. The Army of the Ohio's
march from Kentucky to Knoxville had demonstrated the enormous difficulty of moving
supplies over the Cumberland Mountains; the steep,rocky roads were in many cases
more than a match for mules and wagons,and the route had all but been abandoned. 1 24
The river option was rendered unfeasible by the Confederates and nature. During their
August retreat,Buckner's rebels burned numerous steamships moored on the Tennessee
and Hiawassee Rivers, leaving only a few small vessels. Dangerous shoals on the
Tennessee River--particularly the infamous Muscle Shoals at Florence, Alabama, 1 88
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miles west of Chattanooga--negated the possibility of transferring boats to East
Tennessee from Paducah, Louisville, Nashville, or other northern ports. 1 25
And so it fell on East Tennesseans to feed the Army of the Ohio, at least until
Union engineers had had time to repair the railroad bridges between Nashville and
Knoxville. 1 26 Fortunately, despite the mounting demographic/subsistence crisis there was
plenty of produce and livestock remaining in upper East Tennessee (particularly in the
French Broad-Holston River country) to sustain the combined military and civilian
population for a few months. According to the Union Assistant Commissary of
Subsistence of the First District of Tennessee,Capt. John M. Orr, whose territory
included Hancock, Hawkins, Sullivan, Carter, Johnson, Washington, Greene, Jefferson,
Cocke, and Granger Counties, "from 5,000 to 8,000 barrels of flour [from the 1863 wheat
crop] can be got from this district and the contiguous counties." There was, furthermore,
"a large amount of old wheat not reached [by the Confederates], " as well as "600 to 800
head of cattle " and " 10,000 to 12,000 pounds of bacon " that could be purchased or
impressed by Union quartermasters and shipped back to Knoxville. Orr added that "the
crops of com and potatoes are said to be unusually great. I believe that the greater part of
1 ,000,000 bushels [of] com can be got out of the district ...besides potatoes, vinegar,
and hospital stores." 1 27
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Much as he needed the foodstuffs for his army, however, Burnside sought to
strike a balance between feeding his soldiers and respecting civilian property. His
solution to the problem was to sternly punish illicit foraging, even if it left his soldiers on
short rations. 128 More than one looter in the Army of the Ohio was subjected to the
"medieval" punishment of cheek-branding during the march from Kentucky to East
Tennessee. This technique,as humiliating as it was painful,left the victim permanently
scarred (usually with a "T" signifying "thief') and subject to public disgrace. Although
Burnside abandoned such inhumane punishments on reaching Knoxville, he was no less
determined to enforce discipline. In a September 18 letter,John Watkins described the
"severe punishment" of a convicted looter: "On Tuesday morning . . . .All the troops
marched down to town to see a fellow belonging to Wolford' s Cavalry drumed before his
regiment . . . with ½ of his head s[h Javed his hands tied behind him and large placard
pined on his breast with the word thief printed on it in large letters. for robbing a home
and setting it on fire. and besides all that he is sent to Johnson's Island for the rest of his
term of service without pay." 1 29
Anti-looting policies applied to civilians as well,particularly those Unionists bent
on victimizing their secessionist neighbors. On one occasion, a group of Unionists
approached Burnside near Cumberland Gap,seeking his permission to "go down . . . into
the valley,and carry off the hogs and cattle we find there." The general,not wishing to
encourage an escalation of the region's fierce internecine feud, refused their request.
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Undaunted, the Unionists reminded him that secessionists had plundered their farms
during the Confederate occupation, and insisted that they would "carry off only the cattle
and hogs of the rebels. " At this, Burnside had had enough. Fixing the would-be looters
with a stern gaze, he informed them that thievery violated the tenants of civilized warfare.
He then turned his horse and rode away, leaving the would-be looters "very much
disappointed. " 1 30
So it passed that for two and a half weeks following the Union conquest of East
Tennessee the region's civilians did their best to adjust to the new circumstances.
Surprisingly, after all that had occurred during the Confederate occupation, political
violence was not widespread, although there were isolated incidents of personal
reprisal. 13 1 Unionists were, for the most part, content to leave their secessionist neighbors
in peace, and Union soldiers did little to alarm the region's secessionist population, save
for engaging in acts of petty thievery and property destruction. 13 2 Some secessionists,
eager to ingratiate themselves with the region's Unionist majority, disavowed their ties to
the Confederate government and collaborated openly with federal authorities. 1 33 Long
after the war, Thomas Humes recalled the sight of repentant secessionists lining up at
Provost Marshal General Samuel P. Carter's office, hoping "to take the oath of
allegiance " and "carry home .. . an official certificate of their title to the protection . .. of
13 0
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their persons and property." A few enterprising Unionists made a lucrative business out
of catering to their penitent neighbors. According to Humes, "citizens who had influence
with the military authorities were kept busy in service of their Confederate friends. . . .
Instances occurred, if rumor be true, of ten dollars each being charged for introducing
people to General Carter.''1 34
Had secessionists only known of the Confederate government's determination to
reclaim East Tennessee, they might well have exhibited more loyalty. Unionists would
certainly have viewed it as cause for concern, and perhaps been less bold in revealing
long-hidden political sympathies. And yet neither group appears to have noticed events
then transpiring in far-away northern Virginia--or of they did, spent precious little time
pondering their implications.
East Tennessee, the Richmond Examiner had remarked in 1861, represented the
"Keystone of the Confederate Arch"; to lose its two major railroads (together the most
direct link between Richmond and the Deep South), not to mention its remaining
agricultural stores, would badly hurt the Confederacy. Thus it was that on September 9
(the same day that Union forces seized Cumberland Gap and Chattanooga) 13,000 men of
General James Longstreet's First Corps, Army of Northern Virginia, began boarding
railroad cars at Orange Court House, Virginia. Their destination was the north Georgia
railroad depot of Ringgold. On arriving there, they would join forces with Bragg's Army
of Tennessee and together counterattack Rosecrans's Army of the Cumberland. With

134

Humes, Loyal Mountaineers, 230-31.

93
luck, they would catch the Yankees by surprise, routing them and recapturing
Chattanooga. 1 3 5
The plan, as it happened, worked beautifully--at least in the short term. Bragg
ambushed an unwary Rosecrans on September 19, pinning the Army of the Cumberland
in place long enough for Longstreet's force (which had traveled approximately 950 miles
in the last ten days) to reach nearby Ringgold. When five of Longstreet's nine brigades
entered the fray the following afternoon, their presence proved decisive; the battle
hardened veterans of Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia smashed through
Rosecrans's thinly-stretched battle line, routing the Army of the Cumberland and sending
it in a panicked flight towards Chattanooga. 1 3 6
Decisive action on Bragg's part might well have turned the initial rout into a
major victory--and, more importantly, forced open East Tennessee's southern gate. But it
was not to be. The overly-cautious Bragg, fearful of a Union counterattack, moved the
Army of Tennessee tentatively north; Rosecrans took advantage of the respite to recover
his senses, gather his scattered forces, and entrench them in Chattanooga. The initiative
lost, Bragg had little choice but to besiege his foe. By September 30 the rebels occupied
a six-mile-long semicircle of steep ridges south of town, pinning the Yankees against the
Tennessee River and, with the exception of one muddy, sixty-mile-long path that
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connected Chattanooga to Bridgeport,Alabama,severing their connections with
Nashville. 1 3 7
Many East Tennesseans apparently viewed the battle of Chickamauga as little
more than a temporary Union setback. Eight days after the battle, with the Army of the
Cumberland fighting for its life in Chattanooga, Knoxville Unionist Horace Maynard
made a startling declaration to Military Governor Andrew Johnson. "I am satisfied we
are going to hold East Tennessee," he wrote from Cincinnati, "and in that point of view. .
. I think I had better take my family to Knoxville,& make some temporary provision for
them before returning to Nashville. " 1 3 8 Parson Brownlow returned to Knoxville as well,
bringing with him a carriage-load of newspaper type. On reaching the city,he resumed
limited publication of his newspaper,using it to reswne public castigation of "the more
rabid secessionists " 1 39
Maynard's and Brownlow's faith in Union arms was not necessarily misplaced.
On September 24,U.S. Secretary of War Edwin Stanton met with Lincoln,Halleck, and
Secretary of State William Seward,proposing,and winning support for,a railroad
expedition of his own. In a remarkable feat of logistics,Union planners removed the
Army of the Potomac's 11th and 12th Corps from their positions north of Richmond,
Virginia,placed them aboard trains,and had them heading toward Chattanooga on the
morning of September 25. 1 40 Although slower to respond,Union forces in the west had,
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by late October, also undertaken to relieve the Army of the Cumberland. On the 18th of
that month, Gen. Ulysses S. Grant assumed command of the Union Military Division of
the Mississippi, whereupon he promptly replaced Rosecrans with Gen. George H.
Thomas. He then set out for Chattanooga, ordering Gen. William T. Sherman to take two
divisions (approximately 10,000 soldiers) from Vicksburg, Mississippi, and rush to
Thomas's aid. Burnside, meanwhile, had been reinforced by the 6,000-man Union Ninth
Corps, and was confident that he could hold Knoxville. And so Grant ordered him to stay
put, subsisting his men as best he could on foodstuffs gathered in the East Tennessee
countryside. 1 4 1
This, of course, was more easily said than done, what with the large number of
troops (both Union and Confederate) then competing with the Army of the Ohio for
foodstuffs. Excluding Sherman's forces, which would not reach Chattanooga until mid
November, there were approximately 147,000 soldiers occupying East Tennessee as of
October 1863. The bulk of them, about 133,000, occupied positions stretching from
Knoxville to Chattanooga, placing tremendo1:1s pressure on the farms and communities of
lower East Tennessee. 1 42
Hardest hit was the fertile Sequatchie Valley, which stretched 1 25 miles from the
Alabama border to Cumberland County. 143 Standing as it did between Chattanooga and
Bridgeport, Alabama (the nearest Union railhead able to receive supplies from
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Nashville),this once-isolated valley was soon overrun. Union foraging parties traversing
the valley engaged in an orgy of looting that was as thorough in its destructiveness as it
was shocking to its Unionist victims. "When [the soldiers] discover a henroost,sheep,or
hogs," Col. John Beatty wrote on October 14,"they do not stop to inquire the sentiments
of the owner; neither does it concern them if they are about to take the last sheep or hog
belonging to the family. They take them or it as they choose,and perhaps insult the
owner if he or she urges loyalty or poverty and protests against the robbery. " Appalled,
Beatty attempted to curb the destruction by arresting offenders-- including regimental
officers--and ordering quartermasters to adhere to strict guidelines when issuing receipts.
By then,however,he was too late to salvage the situation. "Almost every garden is
found stripped," he wrote dejectedly,"and one will hardly discover a chicken or hog." 1 44
Further north,Union soldiers in the vicinity of Loudon unleashed a similar
torrent of destruction in the Tennessee River valley. 1 45 As the southernmost outpost of
Burnside's zone of occupation, Loudon stood at the end of a very long supply line.
Shipments arriving there from the French Broad-Holston River country or eastern
Kentucky had often been picked over by thousands of soldiers along the way, leaving
quartermasters little choice but to issue half or quarter rations to their men. For a time,
the soldiers adhered to Burnside's strict anti-foraging orders,purchasing foodstuffs from
civilians and harvesting wild game. But as the supply of greenbacks (and rabbits)
dwindled,so too did the men's respect for authority. Troops routinely poached livestock,
1 44
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despite knowing that such behavior was "strictly forbidden. " As October waned, even
these sources began to dry up, and the soldiers at Loudon grew fearful and pessimistic.
Captain Thomas Parker of the 5 1st Pennsylvania Infantry perhaps spoke for all the
soldiers stationed in the area when he wrote: "if we stay six weeks here . .. it will be
enough to kill one-half of the regiment off. " 146
For civilians living in the Tennessee and Sequatchie valleys, the presence of so
many hungry soldiers proved catastrophic. It could be argued that the siege of
Chattanooga created a second centrifuge in East Tennessee, hurling tenant farmers, small
landholders, single mothers, the aged, and others too destitute to feed both soldiers and
family outward in all directions. Not surprisingly, the Unionists among them headed
toward Knoxville (or Nashville) and the safety of Union lines. There, at least, they would
be among friends, and (they hoped) subject to less intense centrifugal forces. 147
Ever the optimist, Burnside remained calm in the face of the growing subsistence
cns1s. For those who had been wronged by his forces, he offered hope of eventual if not
immediate restitution, insisting that "when the war is over, everybody will be paid. " 148
Yet even Burnside had to admit that this was a predicament. The influx of
Unionist refugees posed a threat to the Army of the Ohio; each new arrival competed
directly with Burnside's soldiers for foodstuffs, thereby increasing the subsistence
pressure on the army's foraging territory. And that territory began to contract rapidly in
late October. On the 28th , Confederate incursions south of Loudon compelled Burnside
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to evacuate that town and destroy everything of military value in it, including foodstuffs
and railroad facilities. 149 The foodstuffs south and east of the Tennessee River--what
remained of them anyway--were thus given over to the rebels,who showed no mercy in
seizing them for their own use. To make matters worse,news from Washington indicated
that a sizable Confederate force (about 16,000-strong) was gathering in Abingdon,
Virginia,preparatory to invading northeastern Tennessee. Should this occur,and should
his forces,few of whom had combat experience,prove incapable of stopping them,
Burnside stood to lose access to the entire French Broad-Holston River country. By the
end of the month,"Old Burnie's " once-glowing optimism had given way to fear--fear
that he might have to evacuate Knoxville and withdraw south to Kingston for want of
supplies. "If it becomes necessary," he informed Grant and Halleck,"we hold ourselves
ready . . . although it would be a sad thing for this country. " 1 50
To Burnside's great surprise,the anticipated Confederate invasion of East
Tennessee came not from the northeast but from the south. On November 4,Longstreet's
13,000-man Confederate First Corps withdrew from its position outside Chattanooga and
advanced up the eastern side of the Tennessee River, heading for Knoxville. Although
slowed by a lack of railroad transportation,supply wagons,and foodstuffs,the rebels
made good time. Longstreet and his soldiers crossed the Tennessee River at Loudon on
149
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November 14 and, after engaging in a foot race with the Yankees--one that very nearly
saw Burnside and 5,000 of his soldiers captured --laid siege to Knoxville on November
1 7.

151

As word of the Confederate invasion filtered north, the civilians of upper East
Tennessee panicked. Unionists were, of course, terrified; having emerged from hiding in
the months since Burnside's arrival, reveling openly in the restoration of federal
governance, they now feared retribution at the hands of a vengeful foe. But secessionists
were likewise fearful. In addition to known collaborators, there were hundreds, perhaps
thousands, of Confederate deserters residing quietly in the communities surrounding
Knoxville. Should these less-than-fire-eating "mountain rebels " be discovered by
Longstreet's forces, they faced court-martial or, at the very least, a return to active duty.
As Thomas Humes would later state, "men whose active locomotion may deliver them
from imprisonment that might end in death, are to 'stand not on the order of their going,
but go at once.' " Scores of prominent Unionists, among them 0. P. Temple and the
recently-returned Parson Brownlow, fell in with Yankee cavalrymen and headed to
Union-occupied Kentucky. The others who decided to flee--Unionists and secessionists
alike--were left to struggle alone through the agricultural wastes of the Cumberland
tableland, where they were assailed by hunger, cold, and the ever-present guerillas. 1 52
Those unfortunate enough to be trapped inside the city witnessed seventeen days
of chaos and destruction unprecedented in the city's long history. Ragged Confederates
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and emaciated Yankees burrowed into the earth north, east, and west of town, the former
attempting to strangle the city into submission, the latter fighting desperately to halt their
progress. 1 53 When Confederate pressure in a given sector became too great, the Yankees
set fire to everything in reach and then withdrew further into the city. Scores of private
houses and shops disappeared in this manner, as did the city's railroad depot. Conditions
behind the front lines were scarcely better. Union soldiers, their respect for private
property dissipated by fear, hunger, and exposure, pillaged homes and businesses with
impunity. Secessionists railed against the intruders, convinced that their property was
being singled out by Union troops; and yet, Unionists' property was plundered as well,
often with the tacit approval of provost guards charged with its protection. 1 54
Unionists living northeast of city, fearful that the Army of the Ohio might be
captured or destroyed, did their best to sustain the garrison. It was, in fact, their effort to
move foodstuffs into the city--often at the peril of their lives--that likely saved the
Yankees from starvation. For reasons that remain unclear, Longstreet failed to interdict
the French Broad River northeast of Knoxville, leaving Burnside in possession of a water
supply route. Each night, the farmers of the French Broad-Holston River country sent
produce-laden flatboats downriver to the besieged city. In this manner, Temple wrote,
''the loyal people . . . poured to this point their supplies of all kinds, such as com, wheat,
flour, bacon, pork, beeves, potatoes, hay, and even lard and chickens and turkeys." "The
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supplies thus furnished, " he boasted, "were nearly half sufficient to support the army and
the people. " 1 55
The siege of Knoxville culminated on November 29 with Longstreet's well
known, and disastrous, attack on the earthwork fortification known as Fort Sanders. In
twenty horrifying minutes, Union soldiers manning the fort killed or wounded 8 1 3 rebels
while losing just 1 3 of their own-number. 1 56
Incredibly, Longstreet considered sending a second assault until he was dissuaded
by a message from Jefferson Davis: the Anny of Tennessee had been driven from its
works around of Chattanooga, leaving the Anny of the Cumberland in full possession of
the city. A second message, received later that day, stated simply that Bragg "had retired
as far as Dalton " and that the First Corps should henceforth "depend upon [its] own
resources. " Uncertain of what to do, Longstreet held his position; the Army of the Ohio,
he reasoned, was as battered and hungry as his own, and might well break at any
moment. It was, however, not to be. On December 1 , Longstreet received word that
Sherman was headed north with two divisions, more than enough reinforcements to
render his position untenable. His options exhausted, his supplies used up,Longstreet
had no choice but to abandon the siege of Knoxville. In the pre-dawn darkness of
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November 5, the soldiers of the First Corps abandoned their works, marched northeast
around the city,and disappeared into the Holston River valley. 1 5 7
With the siege lifted, Unionists breathed a sigh of relief. To celebrate,they
combed the countryside in search of turkeys,fresh bread,and other culinary delights,
presenting them to Burnside and his staff for use in a Thanksgiving feast. Unfortunately,
not all of the Union commanders present for the meal appreciated this gesture. Sherman,
who had arrived in the city on December 6,was appalled. "There was a regular dining
table," he wrote in a tone of incredulity,"with clean table-cloth,dishes,knives,forks,
spoons,etc.,etc. I had never seen anything of this kind in my field experience,and could
not help exclaiming that I thought 'they were starving.' " Sherman's words left Burnside
somewhat crestfallen,but they did little to dampen his subordinates' celebratory mood.
In an after-action report,the Army of the Ohio's chief engineer,Col. Orlando Poe,posed
a question: "Is there any man of . . .the Army of the Ohio . . . who would exchange his
nineteen days of service [in Knoxville] for any other of the achievements of his life? "
Perhaps not,although the soldiers' behavior gave little indication that they cared one way
or the other. On hearing that the Confederates had withdrawn,many of them scrounged
up bars of soap and hurried to the river to take a bath. One Massachusetts wag,however,
had far simpler plans. '"Thank God!' he proclaimed to his comrades, "now I can have a
good snooze! "' 1 58
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Although no one knew Longstreet's precise whereabouts most believed that that
he was "skedaddling " back to Virginia. 1 59 Sherman certainly thought so, but he had no
intention of finding out. He was convinced that East Tennessee was a worthless prize
and saw no point in pursuing a beaten enemy through the guerilla-infested valleys
northeast of Knoxville. Union forces should strip the region of foodstuffs, destroy its
railroad and industries, and then abandon it (save perhaps for a garrison at Cumberland
Gap), insisted the red-haired Ohioan. Thus it was that, on December 7, Sherman bid
farewell to Burnside, turned his two divisions around, and headed back to Chattanooga.
Along the way, his soldiers fulfilled their commander's wishes for the region, stripping
farms of produce, burning grain mills, and otherwise creating havoc for the hard-pressed
civilians who remained in the Tennessee River valley. 1 60
Having twice liberated East Tennessee,and in the process restored a measure of
his reputation, Burnside, too, saw little reason to linger in what now seemed a strategic
backwater. Besides that, he had his health to worry about. A lingering intestinal illness,
acquired during his service in the Mexican War and aggravated by the stress of the siege,
precluded his further service in East Tennessee. Union authorities acquiesced to his
request for a transfer and, on December 11,Burnside turned over command of the Army
of the Ohio to General John. G. Foster. 1 6 1
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Had Longstreet simply "skedaddled " back to Virginia, all might have been well
for the Union. But the rebel commander had no intention of abandoning the East
Tennessee, much less his goal of capturing Knoxville. So long as he threatened the city,
Grant would be forced to divert men and materiel from Chattanooga. Georgia might thus
be spared the ravages of a federal invasion, at least long enough for Bragg to reorganize
the Army of Tennessee and prepare to defend Atlanta. Then, too, Longstreet had his own
citizens to think about. With foodstuffs running short throughout the Confederacy, he
thought it better to halt his small army in the fertile French Broad-Holston River country
and let it subsist at the expense of East Tennessee Unionists rather than throw the burden
on the loyal Virginians. Thus it was that he established his winter quarters in the vicinity
of Russellville, a railroad hamlet fifty-three miles northeast of Knoxville. 162
Russellville offered Longstreet an ideal base from which to launch a second
assault on Knoxville. Large farms (few of which had been plundered by foragers)
surrounded the town on all sides, providing an abundance of provisions for the hungry
rebels. More important than Russellville's proximity to foodstuffs, however, was its
distance from Knoxville; the town lay well beyond the Army of the Ohio's reach. Being
very short of wagons, Union quartermasters could hardly gather and distribute rations to
the soldiers in and around Knoxville, much less provide logistical support for a lengthy
offensive up the Holston River valley. So dire was this transportation shortage, in fact,
that the soldiers stationed at Strawberry Plains (a mere fifteen miles northeast of
Knoxville) suffered intensely from hunger and cold for want of supplies. According to
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historian Robert Meinhard, those who survived their stay at the "Union Valley Forge " did
so with the most pitiable of rations: one pint of cornmeal per man, per day, and when
available, the marrow stripped from discarded cattle bones. Even if Union quartermasters
had had sufficient wagons, however, they would have been largely unable to move them.
The army's horses and mules, emaciated and exhausted by weeks of overwork and
starvation,were utterly unfit to haul heavy loads 1 63
Russellville offered Longstreet one final advantage seldom enjoyed by
Confederate commanders: railroad superiority. Unlike his Union counterparts in
Knoxville, Old Pete controlled a relatively sturdy section of the East Tennessee &
Virginia Railroad, allowing him to move soldiers and supplies quickly from point to
point, and to procure shoes, uniforms, and equipment from depots in Virginia. Recalling
the events of that winter, Longstreet wrote that "we were beginning to think ourselves
comfortable and happy. . . . We were receiving a hundred pairs of shoes a day of our own
make . . . promises from Richmond were encouraging, and we were prepared to enjoy
rest that we had not known for a twelvemonth. " His soldiers, few of whom had eaten a
full meal since leaving Virginia in September, shared their commander's enthusiasm.
"We lived like fighting cocks," one of them wrote, " adding that "for the next two months
we had the best time of our soldier lives. " 1 64
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Strategically, then, Longstreet's decision to spend the winter in upper East
Tennessee made perfect sense. There was little danger of an attack on his position--at
least not in the short-term--and there was plenty of food. However, his presence had a
disastrous effect on the civilian population, shifting upper East Tennessee's axis of
rotation away from Knoxville and into the French Broad-Holston River country.
So great were the centrifugal forces emanating from the vicinity of Russellville-
the Confederates had little incentive to deal fairly with civilian political enemies and
were thus prone to strip civilians of every vestige of property--that thousands of East
Tennessee civilians were hurled into eastern Kentucky, Middle Tennessee, and points
beyond. Nine thousand Unionists (a number equivalent to Sevier County's entire
population in 1 860) arrived in Union-occupied Nashville between January 1 and
February 28, 1 864, where they were housed by military authorities in temporary shelters.
Many more continued on to Louisville, Cincinnati, Cairo, and other Midwestern towns,
where they often received a cool reception from northern hosts. "Many old anti-slavery
Midwesterners," writes historian William C. Harris, "resented the influx of a large
number of Southerners into their midst," regardless of their political loyalties. Store
owners, steamboat pilots, and railroad conductors often refused to accep.t Confederate
currency for their services, or if they did, charged the refugees exorbitant exchange
rates. 1 65
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An increasing number of refugees chose, however, to stay in Knoxville.
Although the reasons for this are unclear, it is likely that a number of factors, most
notably the threat posed by guerillas and Confederate raiders, served to deter many
would-be emigres. In a February 5 letter to Andrew Johnson, Unionist John W.Taylor
described his own harrowing escape across the Cumberland tableland. "The Rebles run
me so fare up into Ky, " he wrote, "that they Came within twenty miles of Danville... .I
tore all of my Clothes by running through the Mountains and timber, So when I got into
Danville, i was almost naked." Faced with such risks, it is little wonder that many
refugees decided to stay put. Union authorities in Knoxville were, they assumed, just as
capable of providing them with food, shelter, and protection as those in far-away
Nashville. More importantly, Knoxville was closer to home, allowing refugees to
maintain contact--however tenuous--with their farms, families, and businesses. Thomas
Humes agreed: "As confidence in the security and certainty of rest which Knoxville
offered . ..increased, the tide of immigrants rose." Knoxville thus traded in its pre-war
status as the region's unofficial economic capital, assuming instead the mantle of
caretaker and provider. 1 66
By January the city bulged at the seams. "The stream of new, homeless, hungry
population, " Humes wrote, "filled vacant tenements, and flowed into the University
buildings not already occupied by soldiers." Those unable to find housing lay huddled
"all night ... uncovered . . . [and] exposed to the inclemencies of the weather." Although
· K.noxvillians sympathized with their neighbors' plight, they were nevertheless alarmed
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by the sudden influx of refugees. Crime proliferated as the dispossessed, their respect for
private property dulled by hunger and exposure, stole from homes and businesses. On
January 25, the Whig reported that there were "gangs of thieves in the city . . . . Digging
under smoke-houses, robbing com cribs, breaking into stores, and stealing clothes off of
lines. " More alarming than crime, however, was the threat the refugees posed to the
city's carrying capacity. Union quartermasters, their supply network still a shambles,
were unable to acquire foodstuffs for their own soldiers, much less the crowds of hungry
civilians. Fearing that the Army of the Ohio might well abandon Knoxville for want of
supplies, prominent Unionists urged General Foster to expel the refugees from the city.
Foster, mercifully, refused to do so, but not before ordering his provost marshal, General
Samuel P. Carter, to cease all charitable handouts. 1 67
Desperate to alleviate the demographic pressure building in Knoxville, Foster
made an ill-fated attempt to reclaim the French Broad-Holston River country. Between
December 7 and February 12, the Army of the Ohio clashed repeatedly with Longstreet's
forces only to be repulsed time and again by the better-fed, better-equipped rebels. With
each loss, the Yankees' supply crisis grew worse. Retreating units, their horses and
mules too exhausted to move, left wagonloads of ammunition, rations, clothing, tents,
and other vital equipment strewn along the roadsides of northeastern Tennessee.
Recognizing the futility of the situation, Grant decided to suspend further operations in
the region, at least until the East Tennessee & Georgia Railroad could be repaired. He
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thus ordered Foster's replacement,General John M. Schofield,to "give your men all the
rest you can preparatory to early operations in the Spring. " 1 68
Foster's attempt to liberate the French Broad-Holston River country not only
failed militarily but also inflicted additional hardships on the civilian populace. Lacking
supplies of their own,the Yankees acquired most all of their foodstuffs from the
inhabitants; and when the inhabitants were less than forthcoming, the soldiers were not
above stealing. Sgt. Isaac Gause of the 2nd Ohio Cavalry, who patrolled the
Jonesborough turnpike near Morristown, described a typical foraging expedition:
"Parties were sent into the unfrequented neighborhoods to bring in what they could carry.
. . . Each trooper collected a half-dozen chickens, a sack of com, and two bundles of
fodder. . .. This had come to be a common thing for us. " So adept were Gause and his
men at foraging, in fact, that they stole entire beehives from unsuspecting farmers.
Recalling one such raid, during which he and his comrades were stung repeatedly by
"winged campaigners " bent on protecting their hive, Gause noted that "the spoils repaid
us for our wounds, which were all healed inside of two or three days. " Thievery may
have amused Yankee troopers,but it provoked outrage among Unionists. "Seizures of
private property, " Knoxvillian David Anderson Deadrick wrote in his journal, "have been
. . . extended under Federal rule. . . . They take what is yours, even some of those who
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claim to be gentlemen, with an indifference and callousness as to your rights . . . [and]
exhibiting a total want of moral principle." 1 69
Distressed at their plight, their faith in Union authorities waning, East
Tennesseans took matters into their own hands. On February 8, prominent Unionists met
in Knoxville to form "an Association to receive contributions for the relief of the needy
people of the region. " The first act of the East Tennessee Relief Association (ETRA) was
to send agents into the northern states, there to solicit money and supplies for charitable
distribution. These efforts met with immediate success. G. M. Hazen and Nathaniel
Taylor collected $43,636 from donors in Massachusetts, Maine, New York, and Ohio,
more than half of which was used to purchase foodstuffs in Cincinnati. Women's sewing
circles in Boston and Philadelphia rallied to the cause as well, producing thirty-four
boxes and five barrels of clothing for destitute Unionists. Union authorities in Nashville
offered assistance in the venture, transporting the goods insofar as they could aboard
military trains. The first shipment arrived in Knoxville on March 26 and, according to
Humes, "furnished for some weeks a sufficiency to meet urgent wants of the people. " 1 70
It was not until April 1864 that Longstreet, his services needed elsewhere, at last
led the Confederate First Corps back to northern Virginia. By then, however, the once
fertile French Broad-Holston River country--the region's last and most abundant
storehouse of foodstuffs--had been reduced to a wasteland of barren fields and ransacked
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homes. Union corporal John Watkins, himself a farmer back in Ohio, was shocked by the
destruction. "Of all the God forsaken countries any body ever saw I think this is it. From
Knoxville up as far as the Army has been.. .. Was that it was good grain country. and
last year it was all planted to com. but this spring I don't think there will be anything put
in. for there is not a fence of any description left in sight. . .. And no .. .animals to plow
the land with[.] what we have not got the rebels have and going back and forth the
armies ... have left it pretty well stocked with dead horses and mules." Also devastated
were numerous towns, most notably Bean's Station. Standing between Knoxville and
Russellville, Bean's Station was occupied and re-occupied by troops on numerous
occasions during the winter of 1863- 1864. By war's end, all that remained of this once
bustling entrepot was, in the words of J.B. Killebrew, "a sad, silent scene of
devastation. " 1 7 1
Unfortunately for East Tennesseans, the Union high command responded to the
Confederate withdrawal not by strengthening its position in the region, but by turning its
attention, and its resources, elsewhere. In March 1864, Gen. William T. Sherman had
assumed command of the Union Military Division of the Mississippi, giving him control
over, among other things, the armies of the Ohio and the Cumberland. Convinced that
the Union war effort would be best served by advancing against Atlanta, "Uncle Billy "
set out immediately to concentrate all available troops and supplies in Chattanooga. The
general's ambitions were, however, more grandiose than his material means. By his own
admission, "the capacity of the railroads from Nashville forward to ... Chattanooga
17 1
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[was] so small, especially in number of locomotives and cars,that . . . they were barely
able to supply the wants of the armies then dependent on them, with no power of
accumulating a surplus in advance. " Undaunted, Sherman met with his subordinates
(Schofield included) in Chattanooga,instructing them to "make immediate preparations
for .. .regulating the distribution of supplies that were coming up by rail from Nashville
as equitably as possible." 1 72
To their dismay, East Tennesseans soon discovered that, in Sherman's
vocabulary,equitable distribution meant a massive reduction in the volume of foodstuffs
being shipped to Knoxville. On April 6, the general forbade his railroad operators to
transport anything other than "the essential articles of food, ammunition,and supplies for
the army proper " aboard military trains. This decision provoked a howl of protest from
East Tennessee Unionists. Having sent tens of thousands of their fathers, brothers, and
sons into the Union ranks, as well as sustained the Army of the Ohio during its darkest
hour, Unionists felt that the federal government owed them some protection and material
support. Sherman, however, would not be swayed, even when the President sought to
intervene. Asked by Lincoln if it might be possible to "modify " the order and divert
humanitarian aid towards Knoxville, Sherman replied simply that "a great campaign was
impending, on which the fate of the nation hung; that our railroads had but limited
capacity, and could not provide for the necessities of the army and the people too. "
Although deeply troubled by the thought of abandoning East Tennessee loyalists, Lincoln
agreed to Sherman's plan and withdrew his request. With carte blanche to operate as he
2
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wished, the general began stripping soldiers from East Tennessee, adding them to his
rapidly-growing army in Chattanooga. 1 73
First to go were the 15,000 soldiers of Schofield's 23 rd Corps, who departed their
miserable camps at Strawberry Plains and began marching south in early April. They
were joined soon thereafter by Gen. George Stoneman's 4,000-man cavalry corps, the
only mounted force of any consequence stationed north of Chattanooga. Of the 7,856
Union soldiers who remained in upper East Tennessee, only 3,854 were deemed "present
for duty equipped " as of April 10. Moreover, approximately 1,500 of them were
assigned to posts in the Clinch River valley, leaving just 2,406 (mostly heavy artillerists
and thus incapable of offensive action) to protect Knoxville and oppose Confederate
incursions originating in southwest Virginia. With no one left to oppose them, guerillas,
bandits, and small bands of Confederate regulars roamed the countryside northeast of
Knoxville, plundering with impunity. "This is to be the ruin of our people, " Unionist
John Netherland lamented, "as our people in a great measure, depend on this harvest for
their means of living. " 1 74
Sherman had his soldiers and supplies and he would soon have Atlanta as well.
The city fell to Union forces on September 2, 1864, proving to Sherman, at least in his
own mind, that abandoning East Tennessee had been the correct move. 1 7 5 The general's
"friends " in upper East Tennessee, however, might well have disagreed with this
1 73
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assessment. The cessation of civilian railroad traffic, necessary though it may have been
to the Union war effort, had paralyzed the ETRA.1 76 As of June 4, approximately eight
months after the humanitarian crisis began in earnest, ETRA representatives in Knoxville
had received from Northern donors a paltry 40,277 lbs. of bacon, 1 ,646 bushels of corn,
1 , 1 51 barrels of flour, and 1 ,224 lbs. of beef--less than one county's worth of pre-war
agricultural production. To make matters worse, the Army of the Ohio's small remnant
had been rendered immobile, and therefore incapable of protecting distribution agents
wishing to travel to the more remote counties. "It was therefore thought advisable,"
Humes wrote, "that twice the quantity of supplies originally apportioned to several
accessible counties . . . be issued to them. This was done in . . . Knox, Sevier, Rhea,
Roane, Campbell, Claiborne, Scott, and Morgan." Those living beyond the ETRA's
reach faced a hard choice: remain at home and risk starvation, or undertake the dangerous
journey to Knoxville. Hundreds chose the latter course, further swelling the city's
population and forcing Union authorities to erect temporary shelters on the south bank of
the river. 1 77
Anxious to get the refugees out of Knoxville and back to their farms, Schofield
actively promoted a resumption of agricultural production. With Grant's permission, he
purchased seed corn from Nashville merchants and had it shipped to Knoxville aboard
military trains. On receiving the grain, Union quartermasters sold it to landowners in five
bushel allotments--a small amount, perhaps, but more than enough to meet the immediate
1 76
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needs of farm families. This accomplished, Schofield next attempted to compensate for
the regional draught animal shortage, ordering his quartermasters to loan all horses and
mules deemed "unfit for service " to farmers residing within Union lines. Thanks in large
part to the general's efforts, valley farmers had, by mid-August, succeeding in producing
modest amounts of com. Encouraged by the "extensive cultivation " that he witnessed
while taking a train from Loudon to Chattanooga, Parson Brownlow reassured Whig
readers that "our people are not to starve as we have all feared. " 1 7 8
Unfortunately, this would be yet another bitter harvest for East Tennesseans. In
early August, Confederate general Joe Wheeler led 4,500 cavalrymen into the region
from Georgia, plundering farms, seizing livestock, and demonstrating the impotence of
Union forces stationed in the vicinity of Knoxville. The raiders first appeared near
Cleveland where on August 8 they were driven off by Union troops. Undaunted, the
rebels descended on nearby Athens, burning the railroad depot, seizing food and clothing
from helpless civilians, and robbing storekeepers. Continuing north, the raiders rode
unopposed into Sweetwater on the morning of September 9. They set fire to the town's
depot, burned numerous bridges, and destroyed 420 bales of hay. In their most daring
move, the rebels stormed into Maryville on August 15, routing a fifty-man Union
garrison and setting fire to the town. Lost in the conflagration were scores of houses and
stores and, tragically, a warehouse packed with ETRA supplies. Leaving the town in
cinders, Wheeler and his men crossed the Holston River near Strawberry Plains and
continued south down the Clinch River Valley. On September 10, the rebels rode
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triumphantly into Tuscumbia, Alabama, bringing with them 1,000 horses, 1 ,200 cattle,
and 200 wagons stolen from East Tennessee farms."1 79
Battered but not beaten, East Tennessee farmers returned to their fields, racing
against time to save what remained of their crops. In this they were moderately
successful, a fact attested to by the Knoxville Whig. On September 7, editor Brownlow
reported that "the [growing] season has been unusually fine in East Tennessee." There
had, of course,been a labor shortage to contend with, as well as "a want of horses and
mules with which to plow. " And yet he insisted that "the crops have proven very
abundant, so far as they have been cultivated. " 1 80
Tragically, it was not to be. Two months after Wheeler's devastating raid, 6,000
Confederates under Gen.John C. Breckenridge crossed into East Tennessee from
southwest Virginia,routing a small Union force under Union general Alvin C. Gillem
near Morristown and pursuing the beaten Yankees as far south as Strawberry Plains.
Unlike Longstreet, Breckenridge had no intention of capturing Knoxville. Rather, his
goal was to seize produce and livestock from East Tennessee civilians, a task that his men
took to with a zeal born of deprivation. Disgusted by the sight of yet another battered
Union force limping into the city,and by the thought of rebel soldiers once again living at
the expense of East Tennesseans, Knoxvillian Laura Ann Maynard vented her frustrations
in a letter to Andrew Johnson. "Since the occupation of Knoxville, " she wrote on
November 14, "our forces have gone as far as Jonesborough & in some instances farther,
1 79
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six times,& as often have fallen back. . ..At this very moment,our hearts are sickened,
while the resident rebels are rejoicing." 1 8 1
Not surprisingly,a fresh wave of refugees followed closely on Gillem's heels. "It
is sickening to the heart," recently-appointed Federal Treasury Agent William G.
Brownlow wrote to Andrew Johnson, "to stand here and look at one thousand men,
women,and children, coming in through the mud and rain, leading their stock, and
driving cows ... to save what they can, as they are driven from their homes. And to add
to my ...anguish ... I have no houses ...no any thing else to give them shelter. The
picture is wors[ e] than I make it." 1 82
For once,however,Union forces were prepared to respond. On December 10,
General George Stoneman set out from Knoxville with 5,500 cavalrymen, determined to
drive the rebels out of northeastern Tennessee once and for all. As the Yankees moved
up the Holston River valley they encountered little resistance; Breckenridge,having
gathered much East Tennessee produce, had long-since withdrawn to Wytheville,
Virginia. Thus unopposed, Stoneman's troopers moved quickly through Kingsport and
Bristol,tearing up railroad track and burning rolling stock as they went. They next
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descended on Saltville, Virginia, where they brushed aside Breckenridge's small force
before destroying one of the Confederacy's last viable saltworks. To complete their
handiwork, the raiders rode north into Wytheville, burning the railroad machine shops-
and in the process most of the town--to the ground. Their mission accomplished,
Stoneman' s troopers turned their horses around and headed back to Knoxville. All told,
they had destroyed thirteen trains, burned four towns, and captured 3,000 horses and
mules. "The whole thing was a complete success," Stoneman boasted, adding that "East
Tennessee is free from any organized enemy." 1 83
Successful as it had been, however, even this raid failed to solidify Union control
over the counties northeast of Knoxville. Less than one month after Stoneman returned
in triumph to Knoxville, the Whig reported "portions of two or three rebel regiments . . .
between Rogersville and Bristol . . . robbing Union men." Refugees from these counties
poured continually into Knoxville, placing an ever-increasing strain on ETRA resources.
Even in the Tennessee River valley, where Union forces conducted regular patrols of the
East Tennessee & Georgia Railroad, guerillas and bandits wreaked havoc on agricultural
production. On February 8, 1 865, the Whig informed readers that "Bradley County is
literally overrun with rebel guerillas and bushwhackers . . . . They cut telegraph wires,
captured a lot of horses and [ran] them off to . . . Georgia, where they make
headquarters." The citizens of Philadelphia fared badly too. In March secessionist
partisans descended on the town, burning the railroad depot and stripping residents of
horses, mules, and leather goods. Although Union troops intercepted the guerillas shortly
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thereafter, killing six and recapturing the animals, the raid's initial success served as a
grim reminder of the region's continuing instability. 1 84
In April 1865, the guns of the Civil War at last began to fall silent. On the ninth
of that month, Confederate general Robert E. Lee surrendered the Army of Northern
Virginia to Grant,signaling the end of combat operations in Virginia. Over the next few
weeks the remaining rebel armies likewise laid down their arms. 1 85
By May, Confederate soldiers were once again a common sight on the streets and
by-ways of East Tennessee. This time, however, they came not as conquerors but as rag
tag refugees in search of food and shelter. Although most of them wanted nothing more
than to return home to their farms and businesses, there to rebuild their lives amid friends
and family, there would be little mercy shown these ex-rebels. Egged on by Parson
Brownlow, East Tennessee Unionists engaged in what W. Todd Groce terms "a campaign
of both private and public terrorism and vengeance" in the postwar months, the purpose
of which was to ruin secessionists financially and, if possible, force them to leave the
region. In this they were often successful. Using the courts, their fists, and on occasion,
loaded guns, Unionists stripped hundreds of secessionists of their lands and other
property and forced many others into hiding. Memphis, Atlanta, and other pro
Confederate areas were soon choked with dispossessed East Tennessee secessionists--the
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last wave of refugees propelled outward by the region's wildly-spinning wartime
centrifuge. 1 86
Union veterans returned as well, although theirs too was a bittersweet
homecoming. Unlike their comrades from the Midwest and Northeast, East Tennessee
Union soldiers enjoyed little of the pomp and circumstance associated with victory.
Instead of parades and hearty handshakes, they found bread lines and bitter stares; instead
of brightly lit homes and prosperous farms, they found empty larders and weed-choked
fields. Here truly was one of the cruelest ironies of the American Civil War: East
Tennessee Unionists suffered as much in victory as their secessionist neighbors did in
defeat. As they wandered the devastated landscape, searching for friends and loved ones,
many doubtless wondered what it was that they had fought so hard to protect. 1 8 7
As spring gave way to summer--and for Unionists, the great centrifuge began to
slow--the tide of refugees flowing into Knoxville at last began to reverse itself.
Dispossessed civilians trickled out of the city singly or in small groups, returning to
homes, businesses, and farms that had stood vacant for over a year. Those fortunate
enough to possess horses and mules (and who lived in close proximity to a garrisoned
town) set immediately to putting in a crop, hoping against hope that the coming harvest
would see them through the winter. 1 88 For those living in the region's geographic
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margins, however, there would be no draft animals, no military protection, and no crop-at least not in the immediate future. "The war in East Tennessee," historian Noel Fisher
points out, "went on unabated" long after the cessation of formal hostilities. Guerillas
and bandits prowled the countryside north, east, and west of Knoxville, disrupting
agricultural production and preventing the restoration of demographic stability. It was, in
fact, not until the summer of 1866 that the ETRA ceased charitable distributions to
impoverished civilians in these areas, and then only because the organization lacked the
"means to protract it." What little remained of the relief funds was channeled into the
construction of a hospital for the "indigent sick" in Knoxville, to be named after ETRA
founder Edward Everett.1 89
And so, in the end, the Union occupying force had merely completed the cycle of
economic/demographic upheaval begun by Confederate forces in 186 1. Tens of
thousands of civilians (likely in excess of one hundred thousand) had been displaced,
entire towns lay partially or fully destroyed, and the region's agricultural economy, once
the great hope of boosters, had been ravaged to the point of near obliteration. The
railroads, at least, were in good shape, thanks to the efforts of Union engineering crews;
but the losses in civilian railroad property had been economically catastrophic. Hundreds
of cars and locomotives had been damaged or destroyed by the soldiers of both armies
and guerillas, as had numerous depots, machine shops, and other railroad
infrastructure. 1 90
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To make matters worse,East Tennesseans, both black and white, were unprepared
for the stunning social changes--and attendant violence--unleashed in the region by
emancipation. For former slaves, the war's end meant freedom,and with it the
opportunity to seek political and economic opportunities. Thousands of black troops now
patrolled East Tennessee's larger communities as members of the U. S. army. Many
other blacks made their way to Knoxville and other towns,where they settled down in
hopes of finding work. Unfortunately, whites in East Tennessee were no more willing to
accept the new social order than were those in the Deep South. Racial violence, often
perpetrated by gangs of Union veterans against black garrison soldiers,swept the region
in 1865-1866. So bitter were the confrontations, and so frequent the murders,that former
secessionist Ellen Renshaw House insisted that: "the Devil seems to be walking at large
in East Tenn. " 1 9 1
Still,East Tennesseans were not without hope. The Civil War had swept over the
region like a great conflagration,destroying the old order and ushering in a period of
profound economic/demographic instability. But the modem observer need only look
forward a few years to the Great Chicago Fire of 187 1 to see that such disasters,while
crippling at the time,may ultimately invigorate a community. Knoxville boosters had
long sought to diversify East Tennessee's agricultural economy, as well as persuade
outside investors to develop the region's natural resources. With so much to rebuild,and
with so little investment capital remaining in the region, the time for seizing such
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opportunities--perhaps, even, for realizing the dream of a unified regional economy,
centered in Knoxville--had come.

1 24
Conclusion

On February 22, 1 865, the Knoxville Whig and Rebel Ventilator published a letter
from East Tennessee Unionist Nathaniel G. Taylor that, to readers, must have seemed
laughable in its optimism. Writing from the safety of Longacoming, New Jersey, far
from (but not unaware of) the chaos then gripping his homeland, Taylor insisted that the
Civil War would see East Tennessee, and Knoxville in particular, "fulfill in ever growing
grandeur, the sublime destiny that awaits her in the future." The "destiny" that Taylor
spoke of differed little from that envisioned by pre-war boosters: namely, that East
Tennesseans could (and should) work to create a unified regional economy, centered in
Knoxville, that revolved around manufacturing, natural resource extraction, and
diversified market agriculture. But the circumstances under which Taylor and his fellow
boosters would now labor to realize this destiny were now considerably (if not utterly)
different from what they had been prior to the as yet unfinished Civil War. 1 92
By all appearances, East Tennessee was in no condition that February to pursue
lofty dreams of postwar development. Entire towns had been reduced to ash (or at least
partially destroyed), farms had been devastated, countless homes had been burned, and
thousands of civilians had been driven from the region, many of them never to return. A
perceptive traveler, passing through the countryside, might even have noticed a
conspicuous silence; there were too few farm animals left in the region to produce the
cacophony of grunting, clucking, and lowing normally associated with rural life. Given
this sad state of affairs, most East Tennesseans were content simply to have a roof over
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their heads and food in their bellies. Economic development, if, in fact, such a notion
could ever be spoken of again, would have to take a back seat to the more mundane tasks
of recovery and rebuilding.1 93
And yet appearances can be deceiving. Consider: the region's railroads had
survived the war intact (they were, in fact, in better shape than they had been prior to the
war, thanks to Union construction crews replacing soft, Southern-made rails with more
durable rails of Northern manufacture); East Tennesseans' scant capital resources (a short
term hindrance, to be sure) would force them to court long-coveted outside investment if
they wished to rebuild (or would at least encourage them to do so); slavery, which Taylor
denounced as an "incubus " that repelled ''the intelligent enterprise, industry, and capital
of the non-slaveholding States, " had been removed; and those rendered homeless and/or
destitute by the war (including landless tenant farmers and the freed slaves) might be
compelled to seek industrial work in one of the region's larger towns, or more
specifically Knoxville, assuming that such jobs became available. Even the region's
agricultural economy--devastated to the point of near-nonexistence by Union and
Confederate annies--had the potential to thrive in the postwar world. With a bit of
coaxing, boosters might well convince farmers to adopt scientific, economically-sound
practices when resuscitating their lands and livestock herds--a move that stood to benefit
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the entire region. Simply put,the conditions and timing were right to foster a wave of
rapid,perhaps even revolutionary economic development in postwar East Tennessee.1 94
Taylor saw it coming. So too,apparently,did Northern investors. On February
27, 1864,less than three months after Burnside's brush with disaster at Knoxville,the
Whig informed readers that "gentlemen,farmers,mechanics and manufacturers, as well
as professional men, are writing to us from the loyal States,making a great many
inquiries about Eastern Tennessee . .. with a view to permanent settlement here."
Pleased by the opportunity to promote his region,editor Brownlow responded by touting
East Tennessee's largely untapped industrial and agricultural potential. "There is no
better watered country on the continent," he insisted,"and wherever well watered,it is
equally well timbered, adapted to the age of progress in which we live, and to the
enterprises of men of genius and energy. When this war is over, [East Tennessee] will
become what nature intended it should be--the garden spot of all the border states." 1 95
That Northerners showed a sudden interest in East Tennessee should come as no
surprise. The East Tennessee campaign of 1863- 1864 had,after all, garnered national
attention,particularly from people with fathers,sons,and husbands serving in the region.
By February 1865,surely every Northerner prone to read newspapers, or who otherwise
kept up with war news,had heard of Knoxville Tennessee and its plucky Union garrison.
Many might well have encountered an ETRA agent at church or on the public square,
pleading with them to remember,and contribute to the relief of,"the dismembered
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families, the brokenhearted widows, [and] the orphaned children" of East Tennessee
Unionists. 1 96
Helping to fuel this sudden interest were, of course, the thousands of federal
troops who served in the region and described it in letters home to their families and
friends. Private Charles W. Abel, a New Yorker who marched from Chattanooga to
Maryville in December 1 863, praised the region's fertile, well-watered agricultural lands.
"It was lovely," he wrote, adding that "fair fields . . . and pleasant villages adorned the
roads on both sides [and] the soil . . . would raise abundant crops . . . . [The] com stalks
grew to a height that with fixed Bayonet a man could reach as high as he could with his
gun and not reach the top." And while he found East Tennesseans' cultural habits
repellent, particularly the tendency of women and young children to chew tobacco,
Ohioan John Watkins could not but concur with Abel's assessment. "There is plenty of
apples in this country," he wrote, "and I never saw com grow so tall in my life as some I
have seen here." 1 97
Others, such as Captain Thomas H. Parker, were intrigued by East Tennessee's
latent industrial potential. As he marched south from Barboursville, Kentucky, to
Knoxville in October 1863, the Pennsylvanian marveled at the veins of bituminous coal
visible among roadside rock outcroppings. "There is ample mineral wealth," he wrote to
his hometown newspaper, "to induce capitalists to invest largely in developing the hidden
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treasures that are known to exist here . . . .It wants a few enterprising Pennsylvanians out
here to show them how fortunes are made." Knoxville boosters would certainly have
appreciated his impressions of their city,for he referred to it as "the most beautiful city
that I have seen in the Southern States." Its "several banks,schools,machine shops,
foundries,several furnaces for smelting iron,and various other works that employ a large
number of hands" were,to him,a reflection of residents "enterprising " spirit,and proof
that the city would make an outstanding locus of postwar economic activity.1 98
If the Yankees were impressed by East Tennessee, East Tennesseans were,in
return,impressed by the Northerners' mechanical aptitude. In particular,they heaped
accolades on the Army of the Ohio's adjutant quartermaster,Colonel Hiram S.
Chamberlain,and his crew of military engineers. On February 22, 1864, the colonel and
his men completed a 1,000-foot wagon/pedestrian bridge over the Holston River at
Knoxville,the first such structure to link the city with south Knox County. Awestruck by
the speed with which the structure was completed (it was done in just five weeks), editor
Brownlow offered this assessment of the Northern visitors: "the Yankees are a
wonderful people for energy,skill,and endurance. Whatever they undertake they
accomplish,and that quickly. . . . Let them settle among us, and in a few years we will
have one of the best and most prosperous sections of the nation." Chamberlain,for one,
accepted the boosters' offer,as did his close friend (and former Army of the Cumberland
general) John T. Wilder. Pooling their money after the war,the two entrepreneurs
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purchased coal lands in Roane and Anderson counties, and then used the coal to fuel iron
foundries in Knoxville and Chattanooga. 1 99
For entrepreneurs such as Chamberlain and Wilder to succeed however, they
would need a cheap, semi-skilled labor force, concentrated in a central location.
Fortunately for them, the demographic chaos unleashed by the Civil War had the
(ironically) positive effect of depositing destitute civilians in Knoxville, the largest town
in upper East Tennessee.
The most visible of these newcomers, and the ones most likely to view Knoxville
as a permanent home, were freed slaves. The city's black population more than tripled
between 1 860 and 1 870, increasing from 752 individuals to 2,609. Hiram Chamberlain,
who praised the freedmen for their strong work ethic as well as their desire to better
themselves both economically and intellectually, was only too happy to employ them in
his newly founded Knoxville Iron Works ( 1 867). Others followed his lead, and in a few
short years, black East Tennesseans could be found working in the railroad yards, marble
quarries, and wholesale houses of the rapidly-growing industrial city. 200
The Civil War had a similar impact on the region's white population. As we have
seen, tens of thousands of white East Tennesseans left their homes (either by force or by
choice) between 1 86 1 and 1 865, and many of them were residing in Knoxville at war's
end. Although the vast majority returned to their homes and farms at the first possible
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moment, it is reasonable to assume that some of them, perhaps even a significant number,
remained in Knoxville long enough to find jobs in the city's industrial sector. The exact
number who did so is impossible to know; let us focus, then, on what is known.
Knoxville's white population more than doubled between 1860 and 1870, increasing
from 2,952 to 6,073. This indicates a significant rural-to-urban shift among white East
Tennesseans, even when we subtract the 632 foreign-born whites known to reside in the
city in 1870, or the unknown number of Northern migrants who doubtless arrived after
1865. Given the region's overwhelmingly rural character, not to mention residents'
staunch adherence to tradition, it is unlikely that landowners, no matter how
impoverished or how badly damaged their property, would have sought industrial work
without having first attempted to resuscitate their farms. And so, the majority of these
new urbanites were likely farm laborers, tenants, or other landless rural folk for whom the
wartime economic crunch had been too severe to withstand. 20 1
It may well be that these new Knoxvillians (and even those who returned to their
farms) were better equipped to make the rural-to-urban transition than they had been in
1861, particularly the Union army veterans. "Going abroad," 0.P.Temple wrote, "was
[for Union veterans] the revelation of a new world... . They saw . . . new methods in
farming, in living, in architecture, in dress, in education. ...They talked with men from
Maine, from Ohio, from Minnesota, from Kansas. By this daily contact . .. they were
enlarged and broadened." He insisted, moreover, that the Union army acted as a "great
university, " introducing East Tennesseans, many of whom "had never before crossed the
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state line, " to the ethic of market capitalism. "To the ambitious, honor waved her
garlands from above, and he struggled upward to grasp them. . . . Life had a new motive,
a higher object to be attained--a grander and a wider horizon " than heretofore. 202
Temple perhaps painted an overly positive picture of veterans' wartime
experience, to say nothing of its impact on their lives. For in addition to his own limited
perspective (Temple, though politically important, was hardly in a position to speak on
behalf of thousands of veterans), he was biased, and prone to portray his fellow East
Tennesseans in an almost mythic light. Still, there is an element of truth to his assertions.
Under no circumstances other than the Civil War could tens of thousands of East
Tennessee have been picked up from their homes, transported thousands of miles through
(and meeting people from) numerous neighboring states, in so short a period of time, only
to be returned to their point of origin. This alone would be a demographic phenomenon
worth noting; and yet, many thousands more Confederate veterans, as well as refugees of
both political stripes, had similar wartime experiences. In the end, one can only assume
that such a profound demographic scattering, however tragic in its origins, had the effect
of broadening East Tennesseans' worldview. The possibility existed, at least in theory,
that boosters and industrialists would now have a more receptive, more economically
progressive audience than they could have expected in years past.
And so, the conditions were right and Knoxville was propelled suddenly and
rapidly forward, riding high on a wave of economic development unprecedented in its
long history. Among the most noticeable manifestations of the city's sudden growth was
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the boom in its housing market. Entrepreneurs and their employees needed a place to
live, after all, and thus new suburbs began springing up north, east, and west of the city.
At least as impressive was Knoxville's startling commercial and industrial growth, which
transformed it seemingly overnight from a comparatively sleepy place into what the
Richmond Whig termed "the widest awake and liveliest town, of its population, not only
in Tennessee, but in the Southern States." Walking about Knoxville in 1 870, one would
have noticed saddlery shops, brickyards, furniture factories, breweries, tailor shops, a
slaughter house, and even a company that manufactured cigars. One would also have
encountered numerous small wholesale firms--the seeds of a larger wholesaling/jobbing
industry that, in decades to come, would earn the city a reputation as one of the leading
retail centers in the Southeast. For those who had spent a lifetime promoting the city,
Knoxville's meteoric rise must have seemed a dream come true. Although rapid
urbanization undeniably brought with it a host of new problems, such as pollution, crime,
and racial strife, there were no regrets among the boosters: Knoxville had arrived, and
the time to seize the future was now. 203
Boosters in neighboring communities doubtless saw things differently, but then,
what could they have done to compete? To borrow from urban analysts Rodney White
and Joseph Whitney, Knoxville accrued "disproportionate amounts of wealth and power"
in the five years after 1 865, allowing it to "appropriate the hinterlands of neighboring
centers, causing the centers to contract or atrophy." Add to this the fact that Knoxvillians
held the lion's share of political power in the postwar East Tennessee (voters elected
203
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William G. Brownlow, Knoxville's most powerful and outspoken Unionist, as governor
of Tennessee in 1 865); that they controlled the region's most widely-circulated
newspaper, the Knoxville Whig and Rebel Ventilator; and that the city stood in close
proximity to an abundance of natural resources (particularly coal, which was funneled
directly into the city aboard the newly-completed Knoxville & Kentucky Railroad), and
one thing became abundantly clear: upper East Tennessee was destined to have one
center of gravity in the coming years, and that center of gravity would be Knoxville.204
For those who made a go of farming in the immediate postwar years, the future
looked considerably less rosy. The Civil War had, after all, done nothing to halt the
region-wide rural economic/demographic crunch; it had, in fact, exacerbated its negative
effects. Recall that on the eve of the war, East Tennessee farmers were, on the whole,
becoming less self-sufficient. Forty-three percent of farm families owned no land, and of
the remaining 57 percent who did, only about three-fourths owned sufficient improved
land (fifty acres or more) to be self-sufficient. The situation deteriorated further in the
aftermath of the Civil War (although the cause of this deterioration was a steadily
growing rural population that forced farm families to divide their holdings, rather than the
war itself). By 1870 the landless rate among East Tennessee farm families had risen to
47 percent. Of the remaining 53 percent who did own land, less than one half could
claim fifty or more improved acres. Thus, only one-quarter of all East Tennessee farm
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families owned enough improved acreage as of 1869 to be self-sufficient. The image of
East Tennessee as a land of independent yeoman farmers had become just a myth. 205
To make matters worse,agricultural production across the region had yet to
resume prewar levels. Census data reveal that in 1869 East Tennessee farms produced
8 15,399 bushels of corn (as opposed to 1,4 16,286 in 1859); 102,599 bushels of wheat (as
opposed to 143,755); 405,309 hogs (as opposed to 565,501); 67,697 dairy cattle (as
opposed to 69,03 1); and 99,703 beef cattle (as opposed to 115,522). There were,
moreover,fewer horses and working oxen to go around, a fact which affected farmers'
ability to prepare the land for planting. Of course,there were plenty of signs that the
region's agricultural economy would recover. The region's sheep actually increased in
number between 1859 and 1869 (from 235,032 to 262,890), as did the hay crop (from
3,388 tons to 3,901). And the region enjoyed a sudden boom in oat production (from
1,423,041 to 2, 154,885 bushels) as well,probably because Union authorities encouraged
oat cultivation during the latter stages of the occupation. Still,the implications for the
short term were clear: there was too little food being produced to support the region's
rural (and demographically unstable) population,much less provide surplus foodstuffs for
the booming industrial city then growing near its center. The current arrangement was,in
the words of White and Whitney,"unsustainable. "206
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Fortunately for everyone involved, Knoxville had the potential to serve as a
corrective mechanism for much of upper East Tennessee. First and foremost, the city's
emerging industrial/commercial sector promised to siphon off excess population from its
rural hinterland, an arrangement that stood to benefit industrialists and agriculturalists
alike. Fewer farmers meant a greater (potential) urban workforce, as well as a more
demographically stable and commercially productive rural workforce (assuming, of
course, that boosters could break their rural neighbors of their ruinous agricultural
practices). Second, the "disproportionate amoun�s of wealth and power " enjoyed by
Knoxville's commercial/industrial class would allow them to establish subsidiary
extractive industries in neighboring communities, thereby creating work opportunities for
landless individuals. This was already occurring to an extent in Roane County, with the
Roane Iron Company ( 1 867), in Anderson County, with the Coal Creek mines ( 1 867),
and in Carter County, with Clark, Quaife & Company's iron mining operations ( 1 867),
all firms that were owned and operated by Knoxville industrialists. And this trend looked
to continue, for there were more than enough untapped resources in the region-
particularly marble, timber, iron, and coal--to attract investors and foster development for
decades to come. 207
At this point, it seems only fair to pose the following question: would these
sweeping economic/demographic changes have occurred in East Tennessee without the
Civil War? Perhaps yes, although to say as much requires one to engage in speculation.
It is safe to assume that Knoxville was on its way to regional economic dominance prior
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to the Civil War, for the city had long since used its railroad connections to undercut
Loudon, Bean's Station, and other regional rivals. It is also safe to assume that the
economic/demographic crunch occurring in the city's rural hinterland would have
continued unabated regardless of the war, resulting eventually in either a significant
rural-to-urban shift among landless East Tennesseans (which is what occurred) or a slow
drain of the region's human resources. And yet, who is able to predict the future?
Loudon might well have rallied in a war-free environment, taking advantage of its own
railroads, waterways, farmland, and close proximity to Chattanooga (itself an important
transportation and industrial hub) to lay claim to at least a share of the title. Or,
alternatively, Greeneville might have used its railroads and position as the halfway point
between Knoxville and Virginia to establish a wholesale/jobbing industry of its own.208
In the end, however, such counterfactual questions are moot. The Civil War did
occur, accelerating (although certainly not completing) the process by which nineteenth
century East Tennessee was transformed from a rural, pre-modem economy based
predominantly on subsistence agriculture to a more modem, industrializing economy
based on manufacturing, resource extraction, and limited commercial farming.
In conclusion, let us take one final trip to the epicenter of this transformation,
Knoxville, during the spring of 1870. Let us, in particular, take a moment to stroll along
the city streets, pondering the Knoxville that had been, the Knoxville that was, and the
Knoxville that soon might be. Gone forever were the sleepy, isolated village of 1838, the
awaking town of 1854, and the sense that boosters' dreams for their city (and by
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extension the region) were just that--dreams. One needed only to visit the city's crowded
wharf, where "up-country " flatboat pilots unloaded "every species of produce known to
our markets, " the commercial district, which boasted "one of the largest . . . wholesale
businesses in the State of Tennessee, " the rail yards, where "long trains of wagons " stood
waiting to unload cargo for shipment, or to the suburbs, where carpenters worked
feverishly to keep up with the demand for new housing, to realize that the Knoxville of
1870 was a place where dreams were realized, at least for those fortunate enough to have
a stake in its growth. True, the city was rough around the edges, often straddling the line
between up-and-coming eastern metropolis and wild-west boom town. But then,
Knoxville at least had the potential to be great, which was more than could be said for it
in the all-too-recent past. 209
That, perhaps, was enough.
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